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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this thesis is to explore the debate between Bas van Fraassen’s constructive 
empiricism and scientific realism. For this purpose I discuss the existence of observable 
and unobservable entities, the observation/theoretical dichotomy, inference to the best 
explanation, the no miracles argument, pessimistic induction, and epistemic risk. I strive 
to show that, contrary to the view of constructive empiricism, there is no clear 
demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities, and that not only naked 
eye observation but also the instrument-based observation plays an important role in 
acquiring knowledge. I agree with scientific realists that there is no highest point to the 
human power of observation; it is open-ended for further development. Moreover, naked 
eye observations are not themselves beyond doubt, as sometimes even naked eye 
observations deceive us. In that context, theoretical explanations help us to understand 
the real situation. As such, there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye 
observations than to instrument-mediated, theory-informed observations. 
Scientific realists are confident in their knowledge of unobservables, and reject 
the epistemic significance of the observable/unobservable distinction. To justify their 
knowledge of unobservables, they use inferences to the best explanation. Such inferences 
play an important role in choosing the best theory amongst a group of theories. For their 
part, constructive empiricists use what is called the ‘bad lot’ argument to refute these 
inferences. I try to show that such ‘bad lot’ arguments fail to succeed at undermining 
inferences to the best explanation. Following scientific realists, I assert that nothing is 
miraculous in the domain of science, and that we can be assured of the approximate truth 
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of successful scientific theories. It is true that many contemporary scientific theories 
contradict previously successful scientific theories, but that does not compel us to be 
pessimistic about such contemporary theories. Instead of pessimism, we can have an 
optimistic attitude about the progress of science. Considering the different arguments of 
constructive empiricism and scientific realism, this thesis gives more credit to scientific 
realism than to constructive empiricism. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
My goal this thesis is the examine one of the key debates in the philosophy of 
science, the realism/anti-realism debate.  Here I understand realism as ‘scientific’ realism, 
that is, the thesis that the claims of a scientific theory concerning the reality of 
unobservables are true, or at least can be counted on to be true in an advanced state of 
scientific advance.  Different philosophers enrich this debate, and in my thesis I will draw 
a special attention to the anti-realist position called ‘constructive empiricism’ as 
developed by the pre-eminent philosopher of science, Bas van Fraassen.  
Constructive empiricists, according to van Fraassen, believe in a clear 
demarcation line between observable entities and unobservable entities. As such, they 
express doubt about the reliability of aided observation in scientific research; for them, 
the epistemic value of aided/instrument-mediated observation is questionable. But a 
realist’s position is different in this regard. In an advanced stage of technological 
development, they believe that we can rely on instruments to provide us with detailed 
knowledge of unobservable, physical objects. That is, not only can we can acquire 
reliable knowledge about the world through unaided observations but also by aided 
observations. In the first chapter, my main task will be to try and show that the 
constructive empiricists’ demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities 
is not acceptable. Human beings, I argue, can extend their power of observation by using 
different instruments and, as a result, their power of observation is not constant -- it 
develops with technological advance. This progress in technology, I submit, changes the 
demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities. Moreover, I argue that 
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the constructive empiricists’ notion of naked eye observation is not itself without doubt; 
sometimes naked eye observations deceive us. Such deceptive observations need 
theoretical explanations to become meaningful, explanations that make reference to 
unobservables.  In this way the reality of unobservables, and our knowledge of them, is 
justified. 
In my second chapter, I discuss various arguments one can use in support of 
scientific realism.  The main such argument utilizes what are called ‘inferences to the best 
explanation’ (henceforth IBE). To illustrate IBE, consider a situation in which we have a 
number of theories about a subject-matter.  In this situation IBE helps us choose the best 
theory by presenting several criteria to determine what to call ‘the best’. I discuss these 
criteria and show how they work to help researchers arrive at the best hypothesis.  I 
submit that the truthfulness of this best hypothesis is assured by meeting these criteria. 
Why is this so?  The way this works is by means of the ‘no miracles’ argument 
(henceforth NMA).  According the NMA, we suppose that a scientific theory is 
successful according to the criteria alluded to above (criteria such as the ability to account 
for and predict phenomena). For me, this success proves that this scientific theory has 
accurately depicted the physical structure of the world.  This is because, otherwise, the 
success of this theory would be miraculous, and  I take it to be false that the world 
contains miraculous (i.e., unexplainable) events.   
Conversely, constructive empiricists assert that scientific theories are only 
empirically adequate.  That is, scientific theories can only be claimed to accommodate or 
predict empirical phenomena, and these features of a theory are in no way connected to 
the truth of a theory (as regards unobservables).  To this end, constructive empiricists 
3  
offer what is called the ‘bad lot’ argument that speaks against the reliability of IBE and 
the truthfulness of scientific theories .  What constructive empiricists are suggesting by 
means of the bad lot argument is this: in following IBE, a scientist could be choosing the 
best theory from a bad (i.e., deceptive) group (lot) of theories.  Thus, when the evidence 
points to a particular theory, this may only be because the competitors to this theories 
were so poor that they posed no challenge to this theory.  But, in response, I will try to 
show that constructive empiricists cannot use the bad lot argument against IBE, since 
realists can raise a similar problem for empirically adequacy. For what can a constructive 
empiricist say in a case where a scientist chooses an empirically adequate theory from 
bad lot empirically adequate theories?  Doesn’t the same problem arise for her? 
Larry Laudan, another anti-realist, presents a pessimistic view on contemporary 
scientific theories. He cites a long list of scientific theories that were successful in the 
past but that are now proved to be false. From this experience he contends that our 
present theories will turn out to be false in the future, and that therefore a realist view of 
science is mistaken. In denying the pessimistic induction, scientific realists try to justify 
their optimistic attitude about scientific theories. In my thesis I will stand in favor of the 
realists’ optimistic arguments, and in support of my view I cite an approach taken by 
Philip Kitcher, John Worrall and Stathis Psillos, an approach that sees progression in 
science but only with respect to those parts of science that remain constant over time. 
Accordingly I will show that the history of science does not indicate pessimism only; 
there is scope to be optimistic about successful scientific theories. 
By analyzing various arguments for and against scientific realism, I finally give 
more credit to scientific realism than to constructive empiricism. In my thesis my method 
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will be analytical and critical and will involve an evaluative study of constructive 
empiricism and scientific realism. 
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Chapter 1 
Observable vs. Unobservable Entities 
 
‘Observation’ and ‘power of observation’ are the key terms in both constructive 
empiricism and scientific realism. No one has doubt about the importance of observation 
in the process of scientific knowledge -- it is an important means of acquiring objective 
knowledge. In fact, all forms of experimentation and measurement depend on observation 
for the purpose of acquiring knowledge and their success also depends on the accuracy of 
observations.  What is the nature of observation? How do researchers observe? What is 
observable? Is everything observable? Can we observe the world where we are living? 
Do we believe in only unaided observation? What is the epistemic position of aided 
observation? Those are the basic questions of the philosophy of science. Constructive 
empiricists and scientific realists both try to answer these questions in their own way. But 
they contradict each other on all of these points. This debate has been around for almost 
half a century and it seems to everyone that it will continue for a long time. In the first 
phase of the first chapter of my thesis I will begin by explaining van Fraassen’s concepts 
of observation and power of observation. Following this I will examine different 
responses to his views and finally I will express my own views. 
In this phase of my discussion I would like to draw a common picture of 
observation and the power of observation. In our daily life, we are very much familiar 
with the ideas of perception and observation -- we see with our eyes, we hear with our 
ears and smell with our noses. Those are very much common and innate phenomena in 
human life. But not only in our common everyday life but also in our academic activities 
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observation plays an important role. We are familiar with some words -- ‘see’, ‘look’ and 
‘watch’ which are very similar to ‘observation’. Although all of them are synonyms, they 
have some different connotations. Observation requires attention. It means to look or to 
watch something attentively. Observation demands an observer’s attention. As Roberto 
Torretti explains,  
I believe, therefore, that instead of trying to cope with perception in all its rich 
variety, the philosopher of science will do well to concentrate on the one form of 
it that is directly relevant to his subject, namely, the attentive, deliberate, 
explicitly cognitive mode of perception that goes under the name of observation. 
(1986, 1) 
  
In the history of the philosophy of science, several philosophers discuss this term 
‘observation’ and study observation in their research. One of the earliest modern 
philosophers to emphasize the importance of observation for the growth of knowledge 
was Francis Bacon.  He strove to reveal the obscurities of nature and in this regard he 
developed three Tables: 
1. Table of presence 
2. Table of absence   
3. Table of comparison. (Bacon 1620, 110-120) 
These Tables intrinsically involve observations and Francis Bacon proposed a scientific 
methodology based on them that describes the process by which one determines the 
causes of an observable phenomenon. For Bacon, observation means naked eye 
observation. As such one can observe the simple objects and events of nature and life. Of 
course, the success of empirical research depends on good observations. The term 
‘observation’ gained momentum in the philosophy of science through the logical 
positivist movement. To differentiate between meaningful and meaningless statements, 
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logical positivists use the verifiability principle according to which observations 
determine the meaning of a sentence. According to A. J. Ayer, “a sentence is factually 
significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition 
which it purports to express -- that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, 
under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being 
false.” (1952, 35) At the very beginning logical positivists explained verification and 
observation concepts in a strict literal sense and as a result this movement was widely 
criticized by different philosophers. At last the positivists accepted a weak sense of 
verifiability according to which “[a proposition] is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is 
possible for experience to render it probable.” (Ayer, 1952, 37) We see that logical 
positivism emphasized observation in the search for meaningful sentences. Even though 
this movement is dead, contemporary philosophy still feels its influence. 
Both realists and anti-realists admit the importance of observation. Constructive 
empiricists and scientific realists both believe in observation, its potential and its 
consequences. But realism and anti-realism oppose one another with respect to the 
limitations of observation. Is the power of observation unlimited or is there a demarcation 
line between observable and unobservable entities? Constructive empiricists support only 
the epistemic value of naked eye observation in the case of scientific research whereas 
scientific realists extend their notion of the power of observation through the use of 
different instruments. Such instrument-based observation brings a new dimension into the 
context of observation. Here we find another question -- does the power of observation 
vary from person to person or does everyone have same capacity for observation? From 
common sense we can say that it varies from person to person. In fact, there is room to 
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increase one’s ability to observe using different practices and instruments. A researcher 
who uses a microscope regularly is a better observer than a new user of microscope. In 
Ian Hacking’s words, “observation is a skill. Some people are better at it than others. You 
can often improve this skill by training and practise.” (1983, 168) In our practical life we 
see that trained, aided eyes are more capable of observation than unaided eyes. 
We observe a lot of things like chairs, tables or trees in everyday life. They 
occupy some space, they have weight. No one questions their existence. Everyone can 
see them when they open their eyes. Realists and anti-realists both agree on the question 
of their existence. We can achieve certain knowledge of them. But realists and anti-
realists do not agree on where to draw the demarcation line between observable and 
unobservable entities. Unobservable entities are often the subject matter of academic 
inquiry and we are not able to observe them directly in our daily experience.  As a result 
they are unreal entities according to anti-realists. Realists, on the other hand, try to prove 
the existence of theoretical entities on the basis of observation. Whereas the anti-realist 
notes that we do not get any certain knowledge of theoretical entities, realists are 
optimistic about our knowledge of unobservable entities. 
On my view, there is no clear demarcation line between observable and 
unobservable entities. Different aids like microscopes and telescopes allow us to extend 
our ability to observe. By using instrument-based observation, we can acquire reliable 
knowledge about the world. For example, instrument-based observation can achieve a 
reliable position in the domain of sub-atomic research. I will explain these comments 
below. 
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Still, I would like to indicate that there is room for false observations. Illusions, 
hallucinations, and misperceptions generally are not impossible. But there is room to 
rectify these errors. A wise researcher does not accept the results of observation as true at 
first sight. She collects several data, and if she observes the same things in the same 
situation repeatedly she at last considers these things as a source of true knowledge. 
Debates about observable and unobservable entities are enriched by different 
philosophers and a lot of elements are involved in this debate. In my discussion in the 
first chapter of my thesis I am going to show that not only naked eye observations but 
also instrument-based observations are reliable for the purpose of acquiring scientific 
knowledge. Van Fraassen emphasizes only naked eye observations and expresses doubt 
about instrument-based observations in scientific research. I would like to show that there 
is no scope to give more credit the naked eye observation than to instrument-based 
observations. Following scientific realists I will try to show that there is no clear 
demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities. The power to observe is 
an open-ended idea; we can extend this ability using different instruments. I would like to 
show in my discussion how both observable and unobservable entities exist and one helps 
the other to prove their existence. Moreover, I would like to support the claim that 
sometimes we find more reliable knowledge about unobservable entities than about 
observable entities. 
 
1.1 The Power of Observation, according to van Fraassen 
The concept of the ability to observe receives a new dimension in van Fraassen’s 
‘constructive empiricism’, as set forth in his book The Scientific Image. Concerning the 
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power of observation, he distinguishes entities as either observable or unobservable. He 
also discusses our epistemic access to different entities.  On van Fraassen’s view, reliable 
knowledge is only possible with respect to observable entities. He claims that we are not 
certain of our knowledge about the unobservable world. He believes that we get an 
epistemic advantage in the case of naked eye observation but no such advantage with 
instrument-based observation. That is, he does not believe in instrument-based 
observation; he is skeptical about instrument-based observation. Observation for him is 
only valuable with respect to our bare sensory abilities. Here van Fraassen expresses 
doubt about the observability of some entities such as electrons and protons. He only 
believes in naked eye observations as a way to achieve certainty and objectivity in 
knowledge. Van Fraassen describes the nature of observable entities in The Scientific 
Image: things like chairs, tables, and different animals are observable for him since we 
have immediate experiences of them. Comparatively, according to van Fraassen, we do 
not observe micro-organisms such as viruses or bacteria since we do not have any direct 
experience of them, that is, we cannot observe them by the naked eye. Therefore they are 
for him unobservable entities and he withdraws all belief in their existence. As he says, 
to be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, 
observable phenomena, and to recognize no objective modality in nature. To 
develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving a search for 
truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual and observable. (1980, 
202-203) 
 
No one has doubt that observation is the main means to acquire scientific 
knowledge, and many procedures of scientific research are dependent on observation. As 
a result observation and the capacity to observe receive important attention in the 
philosophy of science. They also receive a special importance in van Fraassen’s 
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philosophy. In his discussion, we see that he accepts human-based observation as a 
reliable means of knowledge. The existence of things which are observed by the naked 
eye, according to van Fraassen, is not generally doubted by anyone. He notes other kinds 
of things which are observable though no one observes them. As he comments, “a flying 
horse is observable -- that is why we are so sure that there aren’t any.” (1980, 15) And 
there are things which are not observable at all, such as electrons and protons. 
For the purpose of observing something, van Fraassen relies only on unaided 
observation. As a result, according to him, we cannot observe microparticles. By 
‘unaided’ observation he means ‘human-based’, unaided observation, and for him only 
human-based observation is reliable in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge. 
Nevertheless, he recognizes that ‘power of observation’ is a vague notion; that is, 
‘observable’ is a vague predicate. To explain what a vague term is, we can cite the classic 
example -- baldness. How do we define this term? What is the demarcation line between 
being bald and not bald? In fact we do not get any certain criteria that can make 
difference between a bald man and a man who’s not bald. We do not know the number of 
hairs that we can use as a demarcation line between being bald and not bald. I would like 
to cite another example of vague term, i.e., capital. We know that money can turn into 
capital, but no one can say that how much money it takes to turn into capital. There is no 
certain criterion that determines when money becomes capital; thus, ‘capital’ is a vague 
term. Now I would like to explain the vagueness of the term ‘observable’. For the 
purpose of observation we use several means. We can observe things by the naked eye or 
we can develop our observation power by using spectacles, magnifying glasses, 
telescopes, microscopes and many other sophisticated instruments. Some things are 
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observable by the naked eye and some things are observable by instruments. Also, some 
things are not observable at all. Overall, we cannot draw a strict demarcation line 
between observable and unobservable entities. As a result ‘observable’ becomes a vague 
predicate. Nevertheless, van Fraassen comments, “a vague predicate is usable provided it 
has clear cases and clear counter-cases. Seeing with the unaided eye is a clear case of 
observation.” (1980, 16) Thus, van Fraassen is confident in the reliability and coherence 
of naked eye observation. On this basis, scientific theories can said to be empirically 
adequate, that is, “what [they say] about the observable things and events in the world 
[are] true (van Fraassen 1980, 12). Such empirical adequacy is possible only where we 
have observable entities. In fact, van Fraassen notes, “when [a] hypothesis is solely about 
what is observable, the two procedures [(i.e., the decision to accept and the decision to 
accept as empirically adequate)] amount to the same thing. For, in that case, empirical 
adequacy coincides with truth.” (1980, 72)  
With van Fraassen’s view on the power of observation, we gain an epistemic 
distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Instruments can play a role in 
observation, but they result only in conditional observations. We cannot accept them 
directly. Van Fraassen uses the example of the moons of Jupiter that researchers can see 
through a telescope as well as by the naked eye if they could come close to them (1980, 
16). An astronaut can see the moons of Jupiter by telescope and it is possible for him to 
see these by the naked eye. In the same way we can guess the existence of a plane in the 
sky by seeing a vapor trail and we can see it by naked eye when it is grounded. But in this 
way we cannot see any microscopic element. There is no way to see electrons with the 
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naked eye. We cannot see them as we can see planes or moons. As a result, there is an 
epistemic distinction between unaided observation and aided observation. 
We can see lots of things like chairs and tables if we open our eyes. No one has 
doubt about that. But if we closely evaluate our observation then we realize that 
observation depends on certain circumstances. Our experience of a thing may differ with 
time. We see a rose under sun light as red but in a different circumstance we see it to 
have a different color. In a dark place a rose is seen as black. Van Fraassen offers the 
principle that “X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is 
present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it.” (1980, 16) Thus, according 
to him, unobservable entities are such that they cannot be observed by the naked eye 
under any circumstances. He denies the concept of circumstance-dependency in the case 
of unobservable entities. No sort of technological development can bring them into the 
area of observation. Rather the existence of unobservable entities is inferred on the basis 
of observations of the behaviors and activities of observables since unobservable entities 
are not themselves observable. Moreover, anyone can raise questions about the 
authenticity of such kind of inferences. 
Although van Fraassen accepts only unaided observation for the purpose of 
acquiring scientific knowledge, we know that the power of observation has no single 
dimension. It has several dimensions; its development is related to technological 
advancement and its acceptance has different degrees. Also, some technological 
developments involving observation are more reliable than others. But following van 
Fraassen, we need to distinguish between observation and a different notion, i.e., 
detection. As Hanson and Levy note,  
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although van Fraassen does not consistently use the following terminology, we 
believe that his position can be properly represented by distinguishing between an 
observation of, say, an entity, and its detection. An observation is an unaided 
human act of perception; a detection is an aided act of perception. (1982, 291)  
 
We can say that van Fraassen does not reject the role of instruments in detection but 
simply does not approve of aided observation. According to him, “perhaps some things 
can only be detected with the aid of an optical microscope, at least; perhaps some require 
an electron microscope, and so on.” (1980, 16) Scientists can detect sub-atomic particles 
in cloud chambers, but they cannot observe them. One could say that this is a weak sense 
of observation in van Fraassen’s philosophy. Researchers do not see objects through 
different instruments; they only observe the images of objects and they can detect objects 
by means of such images. In a sense, detection is an aided perception of an entity whereas 
observation is a naked eye perception of an entity. In this respect, we specify the role of 
instruments in experimental research. For example, researchers observe a cloud chamber 
and they detect sub-atomic particles in this cloud chamber. But this detection is fully 
different from our unaided observation. We cannot say that we observe sub-atomic 
particles in a cloud chamber. According to van Fraassen “while the particle is detected by 
means of the cloud chamber, and the detection is based on observation, it is clearly not a 
case of the particle’s being observed.”(1980, 17) 
According to constructive empiricism, instrument-based observation is less 
reliable than the unaided observation. We can easily justify our unaided observations. 
The existence of the objects of unaided observations is easily provable. But those 
detected through aided observation require more justification. As Angus Menuge 
explains, with aided observations  
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other instruments are used in addition to our sensory apparatus, and the resulting 
system (sense plus instrument) is more complex and reliant on theory, and hence 
more likely to fail us, than are our senses alone. So we may legitimately require 
some justification for accepting the deliverances of an instrument which we do 
not require in the case of unaided sensing. (1995, 66)   
 
Realists believe that instruments help us to widen our capacity to observe. Adding such 
instruments to our eyes or other sense organs helps us observe objects or events. We thus 
see that there are clear differences between the processes of observation for constructive 
empiricists and scientific realists, and these different processes generate different results 
for realists and constructive empiricists. 
Observation and the power to observe play an important role in van Fraassen’s 
philosophy. To explain these concepts, Van Fraassen rejects the contributions of 
instruments for the purpose of observation and this has had an important influence on 
contemporary philosophers. To draw a difference between observable and unobservable 
things, he establishes a criterion (naked eye observation1) and whatever does not 
correspond to this criterion is regarded by him as unobservable. Moreover, for him, we 
cannot have knowledge of unobservable entities. Perhaps we can say that he is agnostic 
about their reality, whereas by comparison we can achieve knowledge of the reality of 
observable entities. Along the way he offers a new idea about scientific theories. 
According to him, contemporary successful scientific theories are not literally true; they 
are merely empirically adequate. On his view “the belief involved in accepting a 
scientific theory is only that it ‘saves the phenomena’, that is, correctly describes what is 
observable.” (1980, 4)    
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity, I limit my discussion to visual observation, though observation clearly can 
involve other sense modalities. 
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The power of observation has different dimensions. But van Fraassen’s view on it 
is very clear. By the power of observation, he clearly means a human capacity 
(anthropocentric observation). In the logical positivism movement, in contrast, we see 
that they accepted the logical possibility of observation in their weak sense of 
verification. But van Fraassen rejects the idea of the mere logical possibility of 
observation as setting the demarcation line of what is observable. Someone can imagine a 
very powerful devil that can carry a hundred story building but this does not indicate that 
this building is portable. According to van Fraassen, “I have a mortar and pestle made of 
copper and weighing about a kilo. Should I call it breakable because a giant could break 
it? Should I call the Empire State Building portable” (1980, 17) He draws a clear 
distinction between the empirical possibility of observation and the logical possibility of 
observation and he does not accept that the logical possibility of observing something 
determines whether it is observable or not. 
Van Fraassen depends on human observation for reliable scientific knowledge. 
According to van Fraassen,  
the human organism is, from the point of view of physics, a certain kind of 
measuring apparatus. As such it has certain inherent limitations -- which will be 
described in detail in the final physics and biology. It is these limitations to which 
the ‘able’ in ‘observable’ refers -- our limitations qua human beings. (1980, 17)  
 
His epistemology develops on the basis of a human’s observation power. The human 
ability to observe determines the area of scientific research and he is also aware of human 
limitations in this regard. Scientists should not go beyond this ability in the case of their 
research. The aims of science are to reveal the truth about observable entities and to 
explain the nature of observable entities. All of our knowledge is evolving on the basis of 
our observational abilities and scientists can only achieve reliable knowledge about 
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observable entities.  Theories about observable entities can be empirically adequate and 
we can accept empirically adequate theories. But when exactly is a theory empirically 
adequate? In response to this question, van Fraassen says, “a theory is empirically 
adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in the world, is 
true -- exactly if it saves the phenomena.” (1980, 12) 
In this phase of my thesis I would like to explain the role of the inductive method 
in van Fraassen’s philosophy. Science gives us knowledge of the world. This is the 
purpose of a scientist’s work with both observable and unobservable entities. Now 
someone like van Fraassen depends only on the naked eye for observation. On the other 
hand, someone who is a scientific realist widens his observation power by using different 
instruments. Van Fraassen, however, has strong reservations about widening the concept 
of the power of observation. In his research, a scientist observes a phenomenon and 
depending on this observation he establishes a theory. Naked eye observation is a reliable 
means of acquiring information. From here a scientist follows the inductive method in 
which by observing some instances he draws a general conclusion. Drawing such a 
conclusion involves a leap, and where this leap moves from observable to observable van 
Fraassen expresses no doubt about the appropriateness of such kinds of leap in 
constructive empiricism. But in scientific research, we find that scientists sometimes try 
to reveal the hidden structure of the life and nature. This hidden structure (perhaps 
composed of sub-atomic particles) is not observable by the naked eye and in this respect 
scientists depend on an inference to affirm the reality of such hidden things. They are 
able to draw inferences about the existence of such hidden structure by observing the 
effects, causalities and behaviors of this structure. But they do not observe this structure 
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directly. Thus there is an inductive leap here, this time from the observable to the 
unobservable, and van Fraassen does not approve of such kinds of inferences. An 
inductive leap, from observable to observable is acceptable for him but inductive leaps 
from observable to unobservable are not acceptable -- there is an important difference 
between these two. The inductive leap is a historical problem in the domain of 
methodology. In this context the inference from observable to unobservable adds a new 
problematic dimension, beyond an induction from observable to observable. 
 
1.2 Responses to van Fraassen’s Notion of the Power of Observation 
In the above discussion, we see van Fraassen providing new ideas on observation and the 
power of observation in his constructive empiricism. His contribution has an important 
place in the anti-realist literature. But it is very hard to swim against realist currents. His 
philosophy is attacked by many different realists. In their philosophy, we see that they try 
to establish that not only unaided observations but also aided observations are reliable for 
the purpose of knowing life and nature. Following scientific realists, I would like to say 
that in our practical life instrument-based observations are reliable, and I would like to 
cite some examples in this context. Scientists use different types of microscopes to 
observe several kinds of microparticles and they acquire reliable information about 
microparticles through such kinds of aided observations. Also, in astronomical research, 
scientists use different kinds of telescopes for the purpose of astrophysical observation. 
Depending on such kinds of aided observations they make predictions, and some of these 
predictions turn to be true. In our practical life, we note that some people suffer from 
myopia. In this case, if anyone uses a concave lenses in her spectacles, she could see 
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more clearly. So we often believe our aided observations. Van Fraassen does not accept 
instrument-based observation as a reliable source of knowledge about unobservables. 
With his observable/unobservable distinction, he cites some examples of observable and 
unobservable entities but his demarcation line between observable and unobservable 
entities is not acceptable. As James Ladyman notes,  
the first and most fundamental realist objection to constructive empiricism is that 
no meaningful line can be drawn between the observable and the unobservable, 
and the second is that even if such a demarcation is possible, there is no ground 
for thinking that it has any ontological or epistemological significance. (2002, 
187)   
 
Moreover, it seems that van Fraassen tries to make use of such a demarcation line in our 
cognitive ability by denying our knowledge of unobservable entities. According to his 
constructive empiricism, our cognitive power does not permit us to acquire reliable 
knowledge about unobservable entities. But in the history of science we know that it is 
not possible to determine any highest point of human beings’ cognitive capacity. My goal 
is to show that we can rely on our aided observations, that we can believe our aided 
observations just as much as our unaided observations and that it is not possible to 
determine the highest point of human capacity. 
‘Grass is green’ -- we can observe the color green by our naked eye. The color 
green is an observable property of (macroscopic) objects. No one has doubt about it. On 
the other hand micro-organisms like viruses or bacteria are unobservable/theoretical 
entities. We cannot see viruses directly. Constructive empiricists do not expand their 
notion of the power of observation to include the property of being a virus. But scientific 
realists consider the term ‘power of observation’ on a larger scale than that of 
constructive empiricists. According to scientific realists, not only the naked eye but also 
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different instruments are a reliable means of observation. In this respect, the domain of 
scientific realism is broader than constructive empiricism. Scientific inquires are not only 
limited to the observable entities; scientists also try to reveal the nature of unobservable 
entities. They use different instruments to acquire knowledge about unobservable 
elements. Scientific realists are very much confident about aided observations. According 
to them, we can justify our aided observations just as well as unaided observations. 
Although van Fraassen is not able to draw a clear demarcation line between 
observable and unobservable entities, he cites some examples of observable and 
unobservable entities in The Scientific Image. He says that the moons of Jupiter are 
observable entities. Astronauts can observe them by telescope and they can go there to 
justify their observation. But a DNA strand is not an observable entity because it is not 
observable by the naked eye.  Still, according to van Fraassen, scientists can observe the 
image of a DNA strand using a powerful microscope, though this does not for him 
express any reliable knowledge (of the existence of DNA strands). In response to this 
view, I would like to say that we cannot see a lot of things directly but we can get reliable 
knowledge of them. In this regard I would like to cite an example from sociology, i.e., the 
university. Suppose a visitor comes to Saskatoon to visit its educational institutions. He 
wants to see the University of Saskatchewan.  The guide shows him different parts of the 
university, such as the Arts Tower, Science Building, Commerce Building, Library and 
the Administrative Building. After observing these buildings, the visitor says that he 
observed different buildings, but never saw the university itself. What would the guide 
say in response? The guide would say that the university itself is unobservable, but that 
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nevertheless no one has any doubt about its existence. Thus, van Fraassen’s contention 
that we lack knowledge of unobservables is mistaken. 
Several philosophers reject the distinction between observable and unobservable 
entities, and here various arguments are presented. Grover Maxwell’s ‘the argument from 
the continuum’ is one of them. This argument has had a great influence on the 
realism/anti-realism debate. As van Fraassen describes Maxwell’s work (see van Fraassen 
1980, 14), we are faced with two important questions in his renowned article “The 
Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities”. The first question is, Is language divided into 
theoretical and non-theoretical parts?  Secondly, Can we get any demarcation line 
between observable and unobservable entities? Maxwell’s answers are negative in 
response to both these questions. According to him, our language is theory-laden and we 
can not draw any clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities. 
Rather, we have to consider the circumstances of the observation. An object may be 
unobservable due to its present position. But if we can change the circumstances we will 
be able to observe the thing. Better instruments can make a better situation of 
observation; unobservable entities may turn out to be observable. According to Maxwell, 
the line between the observable and the unobservable is diffuse, it shifts from one 
scientific problem to another, and it is constantly being pushed toward the 
‘unobservable’ ends of the spectrum as we develop better means of observation -- 
better instruments. (1962, 13) 
 
At the beginning of his article Maxwell tells a science fiction story to explain the 
power of observation. We imagine a time when no one had the idea of a microscope. At 
that time people had no idea about microbes (crobes). It was beyond the human capacity 
to observe them. But after the invention of the microscope, Jones was able to prove the 
existence of crobes. But his proofs were not without doubt. Some philosophers did not 
22 
admit the existence of crobes. On the other hand, some philosophers concurred with 
Jones. As Maxwell describes the situation  
one group maintained that Jones’ crobes actually never had been unobservable in 
principle, for, they said, the theory did not imply the impossibility of finding a 
means (e. g., the microscope) of observing them. A more radical contention was 
that the crobes were not observed at all; it was argued that what was seen by 
means of the microscope was just a shadow or an image rather than a corporeal 
organism. (1962, 6) 
  
We get two currents in this regard -- everything is in principle observable, or some things 
are not observable at all, and we see only the images of them. It is true that at present we 
cannot observe some things for the lack of appropriate technological support, but perhaps 
we can observe them in future by the invention of appropriate technology. The history of 
the technological development tells us that it will be possible to remove the obscurity of 
entities. But anti-realists are not optimistic about the evolution of the power of 
observation; they limit this ability to only naked eye observation. The power of 
observation is not related to technological development. 
Van Fraassen is one of the philosophers who believes that we do not see objects 
under a microscope; we can see only the images of objects. In this context, we get an 
important criticism against van Fraassen -- i.e., he admits the distinction between 
observable and unobservable entities, but he does not make any clear demarcation line 
between them. According to Maxwell, there is a continuum between naked eye 
observation and instrument-based observation and he provides a strong argument against 
the theory/observation distinction. We can either observe a thing by the naked eye, or use 
different instruments such as glasses, binoculars, microscopes to help us for the purpose 
of observation. Maxwell sees a continuum among all these means of observation. To 
show “a continuous transition from observable to unobservable” (1962, 7), Maxwell cites 
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contemporary valency theory. According to this theory, there are several kinds of 
molecules and their sizes are different from each other. Some of them are observable with 
the naked eye and some of them are observable by instrument. Particularly, there is a 
continuous transition from microscopic to very large molecules. (Maxwell, 1962, 9) An 
example of a small molecule is hydrogen; fatty acids and  proteins are examples of 
medium-sized molecules; and, as Maxwell asserts (on his understanding of the relevant 
science), “crystals of the salts, diamonds and lumps of polymeric plastic” (1962, 9) are 
examples of very large molecules. Whereas such large molecules are observable by the 
naked eye, small and medium sized molecules are not. Citing this example, Maxwell 
rejects the division of observational and theoretical vocabularies, where terms in the 
observational vocabulary refer only to observables and terms in the theoretical 
vocabulary refer to unobservables. Since the term ‘molecule’ refers to both observables 
and unobservables, it is not possible to definitively decide whether the term ‘molecule’ is 
observational or theoretical. Hilary Putnam makes a similar point as regards 
observational and theoretical terms. He defines observational and theoretical terms as 
follows: “observation terms apply to what may be called publicly observable things and 
signify observable qualities of these things” and “theoretical terms correspond to the 
remaining unobservable qualities and things.” (Putnam 1975, 215)  Here he cites some 
examples -- ‘red’, ‘touches’ and ‘stick’ are observational terms whereas ‘electron’, 
‘dream’ and ‘gene’ are theoretical terms. Similar to Maxwell, Putnam rejects the 
existence of a strict demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities for 
we do not find any term that indicates only observable entities. According to Putnam, “if 
an ‘observational term’ is one that cannot apply to an unobservable, then there are no 
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observational terms.” (1975, 217) In this regard Putnam cites the example of Newton’s 
red corpuscles. Newton, Putnam notes, “postulated that red light consists of red 
corpuscles” (Putnam 1975, 218). But if ‘red’ is an observation term, then according to 
Putnam’s definition, it can only apply to observables. Obviously, the redness of a 
(Newtonian) corpuscle is not observable. Thus, on Putnam’s view, ‘red’ is no longer an 
observational term. And so we have, again, a blurring of the observation/theoretical 
dichotomy. 
We see in Maxwell’s paper that the term ‘power of observation’ is not tied up 
with any hard and fast rule. He does not reject the idea of the development of the ability 
to observe. In this respect, we find similarities between the nature of science and the 
power of observation. Nothing is final or absolute in science. We know that scientific 
theories are open-ended for further development and the same goes for the power of 
observation. Human beings can widen their capacity of observation by using different 
instruments; there is no highest point of the ability of observation. At this moment, it is 
true that we cannot see ‘WIMPs’ (weakly interacting massive particles) but it may be 
possible to see them in the future. Five hundred years ago, our predecessors had no idea 
of cryogenic heat and ionization detectors located in deep mines. But now we are using 
these instruments for the purpose of observation. The same idea goes in the case of the 
future development of instruments. We cannot guess what success future generations will 
have in the context of observations. According to Richard Creath, “only a fool would try 
to predict what sort of instruments might be developed.” (1985, 323) This technology is 
advancing day by day. We should express positive attitude to its development and 
activities. 
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Van Fraassen limits the area of observation to only naked eye observations. But 
from the exercise of contemporary science we know that observation and the power to 
observe have a broader sense than that of van Fraassen. Jeff Foss tries to break van 
Fraassen’s restriction. According to Foss, “from a scientific point of view, observing is 
no more or less than the connecting causally of the exterior processes of one’s nervous 
system with the object to be observed in such a way that one is informed by it (i.e., gets 
some information about it).” (1984, 90)  That is, in the observing process, there is a 
causal relation between the observer and the observed thing. For example, in van 
Fraassen’s example concerning the mouse, he infers the existence of a mouse by 
observing various signs. He does not observe the mouse directly; rather, these signs are 
an indirect observation of a mouse and they are a reliable source of knowledge. No one 
can reasonably deny the importance of such kinds of observations in the domain of 
knowledge. In the same way, by observing the behaviour of sub-atomic particles, 
researchers can acquire knowledge about them. There is no room to distinguish between 
the epistemic status of observable entities and unobservable entities. Paul Churchland 
suggests that anti-realists such as van Fraassen are ‘gullible’ about observation, “since 
they suppose that the epistemic situation of our beliefs about observables is in some way 
superior to that of our beliefs about unobservables. But in fact their epistemic situation is 
not superior.” (1985, 41) 
Another realist, Alan Musgrave, also criticizes van Fraassen’s constructive 
empiricism. According to van Fraassen, we can rely on telescopic observation. Using a 
telescope, a researcher can see the moons of Jupiter, moons which are observable. The 
moons are observable because it is possible to observe these moons by the naked eye. 
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Although a researcher cannot observe them at the present moment, they would be 
observable if she were close enough. But, according to van Fraassen, we can not apply 
this idea to the case of microscopic observation. We can detect micro-organisms using a 
microscope but we can not observe them -- they are not observable. Thus we cannot rely 
on such kinds of observations. In his philosophy, van Fraassen relies on indirect 
observations, where by ‘indirect observation’ I mean observing the effects of entities. 
Depending on these kinds of observations, researchers infer the existence of entities. For 
example, van Fraassen infers the existence of a mouse by seeing some signs. But this 
indirect observation is not applicable to the case of electrons, protons or other micro-
particles. Realists, like Alan Musgrave, do not see the difference between indirect 
observations of observable as opposed to unobservable entities.  There is no reason to 
demarcate between the evidence for the existence of the mouse and the evidence for the 
existence of sub-atomic particles. Moreover, van Fraassen does not give us any criterion 
to differentiate between these kinds of evidence. According to Musgrave , “it is a curious 
sort of empiricism which sets aside the weight of available evidence on the ground that a 
casual observer might one day see his mouse or yeti, while the scientist can never see (but 
can only detect) his electrons.” (Churchland, 1985, 206) Van Fraassen’s empiricism is 
curious because he accepts the available evidence in the context of observable entities but 
he does not give weight to the available evidence in the context of unobservable entities. 
To demarcate between observable and unobservable entities, we need to consider 
both sides of this line. At first we have to admit the existence of both observable and 
unobservable entities; then we proceed to demarcate between the two. But in van 
Fraassen’s philosophy we see that he only believes in observable entities; he does not 
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believe in the existence of unobservable entities. As a result, in his demarcation process 
we see an inconsistency. Following Alan Musgrave (1985, 207- 208), we can prove that 
there is an inconsistency in the demarcation process in the following way. Suppose a 
theory T distinguishes observable entities from unobservable entities. This theory has two 
parts -- one explains the existence of observable entities (A) and another explains the 
existence of unobservable entities (B). According to van Fraassen we can acquire 
knowledge about the observable part of this theory but we cannot know the unobservable 
part of this theory. Van Fraassen accepts the knowledge of the observable part of this 
theory but according to his constructive empiricism the knowledge of unobservable part 
is unacceptable. Thus, we can say that van Fraassen does not believe the whole of theory 
(T) -- he only accepts the observable part of this theory. As a result, we see van Fraassen 
cannot forward any coherent theory to demarcate between observable and unobservable 
entities. The demarcation process itself is inconsistent. According to Musgrave,  
the constructive empiricist can accept as true, on the basis of observation, 
statements of the form ‘A is observable by humans’. But the consistent 
constructive empiricist cannot accept as true, on the basis of observation or 
anything else, a statement of the form ‘B is not observable by humans’. 
Constructive empiricism requires a dichotomy which it cannot consistently draw. 
(1985, 207-208) 
 
  Denying van Fraassen’s anthropocentric conception of the power of observation 
in the case of scientific research, scientific realists use instruments as an aid to widen the 
range of their observational abilities. Contemporary sophisticated instruments of 
observation have broken the rigid wall between observable and unobservable entities and 
the success of their instruments in different contexts supports the idea that everything is 
in principle observable. Instruments play a positive role in increasing the power of 
observation. Paul Churchland, a critic of the observable/unobservable distinction, rejects 
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the human ability to observe as the ultimate criterion of reality. He develops the idea of a 
humanoid who has electron microscopic eyes and who can easily observe microparticles 
with his eyes. We find a similar imaginative scenario in Maxwell’s philosophy; he 
comments, “suppose a human mutant is born who is able to observe ultraviolet radiation, 
or even X-rays, in the same way we observe visible light.” (1962, 11) In the light of these 
imaginative scenarios, we have to change the idea of ‘in principle unobservable’. In the 
history of science, we find that the power of observation is a progressive capacity, and 
according to scientific realists we should not tie up this ability to a limited area, such as to 
the human capacity to observe, as van Fraassen has it. 
Does naked eye observation provide any epistemic advantage for the purpose of 
acquiring knowledge? Van Fraassen believes that naked eye observations generate direct 
knowledge for observers. So they can accept these observations without further 
justification. But one cannot accept instrument-based observations about unobservable 
entities without further justification. Scientists have to prove the reliability of their 
instruments. Do they get same result under similar circumstances? How does the 
instrument work? Scientific realists like Stathis Psillos (1999, 199) do not give an extra 
advantage to naked eye observations. If instrument-based observation needs extra 
justification, then naked eye observation needs such justification too, since the human eye 
itself is a complex instrument of observation. As Menuge puts this point, “it is not a true 
principle that reliance on . . . instruments requires more justification than does reliance on 
our senses alone. But if there is no such principle, then, since you apparently insist that 
justification is required when I use a microscope, you should require it in the case of 
unaided vision as well.” (1995, 67) 
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1.3 Some Observations about Observable Entities, Unobservable Entities and the 
Power of Observation 
         In the above discussion, I have tried to show that there is no clear demarcation line 
between observable and unobservable entities. This casts doubt on the use of this 
distinction to support anti-realism. Moreover, there is no highest point of a human’s 
power observation. If we want to draw a demarcation line between observable and 
unobservable entities, we have to define both of them; we have to find some criteria to 
separate them. In the history of science, the concepts of observable and unobservable are 
changeable. We use instruments to observe the micro-organism like viruses or bacteria. 
Now we can observe them with a microscope which was not possible in the time of our 
predecessors. Instrument-based observation brings a new dimension into scientific 
research. But van Fraassen depends only on human-based observation in his constructive 
empiricism. I would like to prove that in scientific research, observable and theoretical 
entities both play an important role. There is no room to deny the importance of 
instrument-based observation as well as sense-experience in knowing nature and life. 
In the discussion of constructive empiricism, van Fraassen depends on naked eye 
observation for the purpose of getting reliable knowledge. Now this raises the question -- 
is naked eye observation beyond doubt? Does everyone observe the same thing in the 
same way? Do they get same experience from the same observation? In this context, I 
would like to discuss Necker’s cube. Suppose some observers are looking at the Figure 1. 
Do they have the same experience? If we ask them what their experiences are we get 
different answers. Someone will say it is a cube, others say it is a box. According to N. R. 
Hanson “some will see an ice cube viewed from below. Others will see it from above. 
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Still others will view the figure as a polygonally-cut gem. Some see only crisscrossed 
lines in a plane. Others will see it as an aquarium, a wire frame for a kite or any of a  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 Figure 1. Necker’s Cube 
 
number of other things.” (Hanson 1967, 91-92) This example shows us that observations 
are sometimes ambiguous. We see the same thing in different ways. Sometimes we do 
not accept naked eye observations directly. As a result, we can say that such observations 
need further interpretation or explanation to become meaningful. 
We observe a thing with our eyes; we hear things using our ears. Sense experience 
is a reliable means for acquiring knowledge. But sometimes sense experience deceives 
us. In that context, I would like to cite a very popular example. By this example I would 
like to show that objects have both observable and unobservable properties. Moreover, I 
want to show how both the observable and unobservable properties help make one 
another meaningful. The example is this: if we submerge part of a straight stick in water 
then we see a bent stick (see Figure 2) 
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Figure 2. Refraction of light with different media 
 
That is, the stick does not appear straight any more, but appears bent. From this 
observation, we conclude that our sense experiences can deceive us. Thus we can not be 
certain that our sense experiences are not deceiving us in other cases and van Fraassen’s 
human-based observation will lead to uncertainty. In reflecting on this example I can 
show that it requires that objects have both observable and unobservable properties. In 
fact, the stick is not bent, it is an illusion; and if we explain the circumstances we can find 
out the real cause of the stick’s apparent bentness. We know that light goes through a 
medium. When it changes media it changes its course because of the different specific 
gravities of the media. In our example we see the light go through two media -- air and 
water.  The refractive index of water is different from that of air. As a result, we see that 
the stick is bent. But in fact the stick is straight -- it is an illusory experience. In this 
context we see that ‘refractive index’ refers to an unobservable property of media; we 
Air 
Water 
32 
cannot see the refractive indices of water or air and they are not observable. Still, this 
unobservable property of media helps us to explain stick’s observed position. As a result, 
we can say that both the observable and the unobservable properties exist and help one 
another to prove their existence. 
I would like to support the independent existence of different entities whether we 
observe them or not. Being unobservable is not a deficiency with entities; it is a limitation 
on observers and the existing situation. This situation is not rigid; it is a flexible matter. If 
an observer changes his situation, he can get a different result. There was a time when 
different micro-organisms, such as viruses and bacteria, were unobservable to human 
beings. Researchers could only speculate about them, as they were hypothetical entities. 
But their inability to be observed was only a limitation on the observers; they simply 
could not make instruments or create situations to observe these small entities. Now 
researchers are able to observe such kinds of micro-organisms through different 
sophisticated microscopes and in this way they are acquiring reliable knowledge. The 
discovery of different micro-organisms is a great achievement in medical science. This 
knowledge helps medical scientists to understand different diseases. Moreover, this 
knowledge assists us in inventing different vaccines. These sorts of cases are very 
common in our practical life and are related to the existence of human beings. In this 
regard, a researcher’s success proves the existence of different micro-organisms and also 
proves that their knowledge about micro-organisms is reliable. So we draw the 
conclusion that there is no doubt about the existence of viruses, bacteria and other such 
kinds of theoretical entities. 
33 
Now I would like to explain another kind of observation that supports the 
existence of unobservable entities. We are not able to observe some entities by means of 
the naked eye. Rather, we confirm their existence by inspecting their activities, 
behaviours and characteristics. It is our current scientific knowledge that oxygen is 
necessary for the existence of animal life, but no one can observe oxygen with the naked 
eye. Nevertheless, it is an important part of air. We can guess the existence of air by the 
naked eye in a special moment, for example, in a storm, but we can not see oxygen in this 
way. Still, scientists are certain that the air contains oxygen and other unobservable gases, 
such as nitrogen and carbon dioxide, through the use of the scientific method.  Thus, 
although we can say that, although oxygen itself is unobservable, its activities, behaviours 
and characteristics as revealed through experimental inquiry prove its existence, its 
necessity. The unobservability of oxygen does not prove its non-existence.  
In this phase of my discussion I would like to prove that there is no real reason to 
allot extra reliable status to our knowledge of observable entities comparatively to that of 
unobservable entities. Here let me compare two cases: 
1. Five thousand years ago people lived in a place that is now called Saskatoon. 
2. Some kinds of bacteria (Helicobacter pylori) are the causes of peptic ulcers. 
In case 1, we note that people are observable entities but we cannot observe the people at 
that time. To confirm their existence we need to use indirect observations, i.e., inferences. 
Depending on the inferences used, archaeologists make a decision on whether there were 
people then or not. In the latter case, we see that our subject matter is the existence of 
bacteria which are unobservable entities. But we are able to get immediate results about 
their existence. Depending on the result of laboratory tests, a doctor can draw a 
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conclusion about the existence of these microscopic entities and can suggest some 
medicine. At last, the patient can get rid of the disease. Certainly, this evidence proves the 
authenticity of our knowledge of van Fraassen’s unobservable entities.  
In the above discussion we see that there are different approaches to observation 
and the power of observation. We get a complex relation among them; we can not draw 
any definite conclusions about this relation. But one thing is clear: anti-realists can not 
make any concrete demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities. There 
is no clear criterion that can separate observable entities from unobservable entities. We 
have to consider them according to the circumstances. Observation and the power of 
observation depend on the circumstances and these circumstances are changeable. In this 
context, I would like to recall the role of modern technology such as telescopes, 
microscopes, and hearing aids which is playing an important role in enhancing human 
observation power. The power of observation depends on technological development, and 
realists are optimistic about the role of instruments for the purpose of observation. Van 
Fraassen cannot deny the importance of instruments in the case of observation. But he 
does not admit the importance of instruments in observations directly; he uses the word 
‘detection’ instead of ‘observation’ in the context of instrument-based observation. But 
this brings another problem for him. We do not get any clear demarcation line between 
observation and detection. At last, we see that realists want to know both observable and 
unobservable entities, and their subject-matter of research is broader than that of 
constructive empiricists; naked eye observations about observable entities do not provide 
any epistemic advantage beyond the instrument-based epistemic achievements of 
scientific realists, and the progressive attitude of scientific realists about the power of 
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observation is helpful for the development of science. Considering all of this we can 
support the realist’s progressive attitude towards observation power.  
In my discussion I tried to show that not only naked eye observations but also 
instrument-based observations are reliable means of acquiring knowledge about nature 
and life. Constructive empiricists deny that we have knowledge about unobservables, and 
on this basis claim that there is a distinction between observables and unobservables. On 
the other hand, realists are confident that we have knowledge of both observables and 
unobservables. According to them, there is no good reason to give more credit to naked 
eye observations than to aided, instrument-mediated observations. In the next chapter, I 
will show that scientific realists are correct in their assessment that we do have 
knowledge of unobservables. As a result, there is no reason to distinguish between 
observables and unobservables on epistemic grounds. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
 
 
 
In my discussion in the first chapter, I mentioned that the debate between realism and 
anti-realism has been continuing for a long time. The participants in this debate discover 
different arguments in favor of their views. One of the strongest arguments in favor of 
scientific realism uses the notion of an ‘inference to the best explanation’ (‘IBE’). Using 
this argument, scientific realists try to prove the existence of unobservable entities as well 
as decide on what is the best theory. The idea of IBE was presented early on in C. S 
Pierce’s conception of abduction, and following Pierce, Gilbert Harman, Peter Lipton and 
Stathis Psillos have enriched the literature on IBE. For his part, van Fraassen considers 
the IBE argument to be a bad argument on behalf of scientific realism. According to him, 
scientific realists in choosing the theory that best explains the data may be simply 
choosing the best theory from a bad lot of theories. It is to reject the IBE argument that 
van Fraassen puts forward this bad lot argument. In what follows, I will examine a variety 
of arguments both for and against scientific realism, along with the IBE and bad lot 
arguments. Overall, I will try to show that although scientists could never discover the 
whole truth about any subject matter, some truth may lie within current theories and that 
we should reject a negative attitude towards the contemporary theories. That is, we need 
to express a positive attitude towards them and be optimistic about the progress of 
scientific theories.  
To understand IBE, we first have to discuss what is meant by IBE. To this end, I 
would like to delineate the meaning of ‘explanation’. Generally we believe that 
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‘explanation’ is an important means to reveal the obscurities of nature and life.  At the 
very beginning of our civilization, everything was very much surprising to our ancestors, 
and science and other branches of knowledge helped to answer their wonders. But 
science has particularly been playing a pioneer role among the different branches of 
knowledge in illuminating all kinds of obscurities. As Alex Rosenberg notes,  
science seeks explanations to satisfy the wonder. But so do other human 
enterprises. The difference between science and other enterprises that seek 
explanations of why things are the way they are can be found in the sorts of 
standards that science sets itself for what will count as an explanation, a good 
explanation, and a better explanation. (2000, 21)  
  
We can accept or reject a theory depending on its explanatory power. When we ask a 
solution for a problem or want to know the causes of a certain event, we find that people 
often express different views on the issue. Sometimes not even experts express the same 
view on the same issue.  To justify their views, they explain their views and try to prove 
that their views are better than the views of others. At last, the best explanation is 
accepted by the scientific community. Here IBE plays a vital role. Van Fraassen explains 
the process of IBE in this way: “let us suppose that we have evidence E, and are 
considering several hypotheses, say H and H´. [IBE] then says that we should infer H 
rather than H´ exactly if H is a better explanation of E than H´ is.” (1980, 19) Similarly, 
Paul Thagard defines IBE as follows: “to put it briefly, inference to the best explanation 
consists in accepting a hypothesis on the ground that it provides a better explanation of 
the evidence than is provided by alternative hypotheses. We argue for a hypothesis or 
theory by arguing that it is the best explanation of the evidence.” (1978, 77) 
Explanation plays an important role in different branches of knowledge -- social 
science, philosophy and the natural science. Suppose someone asks, what is the cause of 
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poverty in Third World countries?  In this regard a lot of hypotheses are introduced, such 
as poverty is caused by colonial exploitation lasting for a long time, by a political or 
military bureaucracy, by political corruption, an absence of democracy, illiteracy, 
shortage of expert manpower, discrimination in wealth distribution, poor natural 
resources and so on. The supporters of these views argue in favour of their views and try 
to establish that one’s view is better than the others. It is usually the case that not all of 
these hypotheses are equally important. Some of them can explain the problem more 
accurately and elaborately than others. In this context the view that can explain the 
problem comprehensively is accepted by social scientists. As a result, explanation plays a 
pivotal role in making a hypothesis acceptable.  
We get a new dimension on explanation when we use IBE. Sometimes we get a 
single explanation of an incident and we accept this explanation. But with IBE we often 
get several explanations of the same incident. These different explanations bring different 
insights to understanding a phenomenon. In the context of IBE, we have the option to 
choose the best explanation from a lot of explanations. We compare different 
explanations and choose the best one. 
 Clearly, then, it is a major obstacle for the supporters of IBE to determine the 
best hypothesis from a number of hypotheses about a certain problem and different 
philosophers try to resolve this problem in different ways. Although explanatory power is 
an important means to realize an IBE, there are several other criteria on what counts as a 
‘best explanation’ in the literature that we need to consider. For example, to judge a best 
hypothesis Harman says, “presumably such a judgment will be based on considerations 
such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains more, 
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which is less ad hoc, and so forth.” (1965, 89)  Paul Thagard, for his part, notes that there 
are three major criteria to determine the best explanatory hypothesis (1978, 79). These 
criteria are used to evaluate the best hypothesis among a spectrum of hypotheses. These 
three criteria are consilience, simplicity and analogy. Let’s briefly discuss these criteria. 
We know that we can find many hypotheses about a certain subject-matter. But all 
of them are not equally important. Some have more explanatory power than others. But 
how do we choose the best hypothesis? In this regard consilience is an important means 
to judge that one hypothesis is better than other hypotheses. A hypothesis is said to be 
consilient when it can explain more evidence, more facts than other hypotheses. That is, 
consilience indicates the unification of different hypotheses on a certain subject-matter 
and the ability to explain the maximum number of events and facts using a minimum of 
assumptions. As Paul Thagard explains,  
a theory is said to be consilient if it explains at least two classes of facts. Then one 
theory is more consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts than the 
other does. Intuitively, we show one theory to be more consilient than another by 
pointing to a class or classes of facts which it explains but which the other theory 
does not. (1978, 79) 
 
Simplicity is another important indicator in choosing a good hypothesis. We know 
that explanations reveal the obscurities of nature and life and every researcher looks to 
the simplicity of explanatory hypotheses; a group of supporters of a scientific paradigm 
try to make their paradigm simpler. This raises the question -- what is meant by 
‘simplicity’?  Is it subjective or objective?  Some philosophers say that simplicity is a 
very subjective notion, a concept that challenges the idea of the objectivity of scientific 
knowledge. But, as Alexander Bird responds, “people may have differing views as to 
what is simple, but that does not show that simplicity is subjective (any more than the fact 
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that the people disagree about what is true shows that truth is subjective).” (1998, 158)  
What Bird is suggesting is that simplicity is context dependent just as truth is context 
dependent but that does not mean that simplicity is relative, just as it does not mean this 
in the case of truth. 
Finally, I would like to discuss the criterion of analogy. By analogy, we mean 
seeking the similarities between two or more things and drawing further inferences about 
these things based on these similarities. In this respect, researchers make predictions 
based on the observed similarities of two things in their past and present circumstances. If 
they find some similarities in the present context they can predict further similarities with 
these two things in the future or in different circumstances. In the history of science, 
analogy has played an important role in scientific discovery. For example, following 
Thagard, I would like to cite the importance of analogy in Darwin’s development of the 
theory of evolution. Selection works as a filter to accept the fit variations and reject the 
unfit variations in a species’ characteristics. Darwin compared artificial and natural 
selection and, according to him, analogy played an important role in justifying his theory. 
Specifically, Darwin noted some similarities between artificial selection and natural 
selection. Artificial selection is a human activity -- it may happen consciously or 
unconsciously. On the other hand, people have no role in the context of natural selection, 
where natural selection is defined by Darwin as the “preservation of favourable variations 
and the rejection of injurious variations” (1859, 81). But both kinds of selections are 
similar in that they are effective only given the prolific spontaneous production of novel 
traits by offspring and the inheritability of these traits in future generations. But people 
select the useful variations in the context of artificial selection, whereas nature selects the 
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useful variations in the context of natural selection. Following C. Kenneth Waters (1986, 
507) we can compare artificial selection and natural selection in this way:  
 
 Artificial Selection  Natural Selection 
1. Variations produced 
(through an unknown mechanism) 
1. Variations produced 
 (through an unknown mechanism) 
2. Man selects variations  (by conscious  
efforts but by sometimes                         
unconscious means)                                
2.  Nature selects variations (by  
providing conditions that give     
organisms with certain variations a  
better chance to live and reproduce) 
3. Variations inherited (through an  
unknown mechanism) 
3. Variations inherited (through an  
unknown mechanism) 
4. Production of domestic races.                 4. Production of natural races 
 
(Of course, the description of the science here is insufficient, but my interest here is 
solely to illustrate a methodological point.)  It was (Waters claims) Darwin’s contribution 
to infer, on the basis of this analogical comparison, that natural selection plays an 
essential role in the process of evolution. Some variations, that is, the genetic change of 
plants and animals, are favourable allowing species to adapt to their environment, and 
other variations are not so favourable. Researchers then observe that favourable 
variations survive generation after generation, whereas comparatively unfavourable 
variations become extinct. In the process of the modification of organisms through 
variations, nature selects the favourable variations and in this way natural selection plays 
role in the evolution of plants and animals. 
42 
 This is similar to what occurs with artificial selection. In this context I would like 
to cite the artificial selections of rice farmers. Rice is the staple food in some Asian 
countries. Its production quantity used to be so poor that it was not able to cope with the 
needs of people. Presently, the IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) is working to 
discover high quality rice seeds that can increase production and for this purpose they are 
successful. Now farmers are using IRRI’s seeds to increase rice production on less land. 
As a result, conventional kinds of rice are losing their importance day by day. A breeder 
will select his favourable breeds. In this context, a farmer selects breeds that suit his 
purpose and these breeds survive, reproduce and proliferate. Though conventional rice 
seeds will never disappear, they may not be used as much as before, which is unfortunate 
since although newer varieties can produce higher yields they only do so with artifical 
inputs. 
As for criteria for good theory choice, W. H. Newton-Smith (1981, 226-230) 
offers a long list. I will discuss these criteria very briefly. 
1. Observational nesting. 
Observational success is an important indicator of a good theory. A good theory has a 
good observational capacities and it maintains a good relation with its predecessor’s 
observational success. According to Alexander Bird, “if one theory explains all the 
observations [that] another explains, and more besides, then, other things being equal, it 
is a better explanation.” (1998, 264) Moreover, a good theory increases its observational 
success by making different predictions.  
2. Fertility. 
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A good theory is always open-ended for the further development; it does not close the 
room for progress. A fertile theory provides us with enough opportunities for producing 
more observations to help the researchers provide better explanations with a theory. 
 3. Track record. 
There are several facts or events covered by a theory. A good theory explains all of these 
facts or events successfully. A good theory should have good success record. According 
to Newton-Smith, “the longer the theory is in the field, the more important its past track 
record becomes. Continuing observational success not only counts in itself for the theory, 
it also an indicator of future fertility.” (1981, 227) 
4. Inter-theory support. 
 A theory is interrelated with others theories. This integration among different theories 
works in favor of their reliability. According to Bird, “mutual integration among theories 
is a sign of their truth.” (1998, 265) 
 5. Smoothness. 
Success and failure are common phenomena in scientific research. Success of a theory 
indicates that it is a systematic development. If a theory is systematic, that means it works 
in certain conditions, follows some rules or methods. As Alexander Bird notes, a smooth 
explanation does not assure us that it is right in every aspect, only that its exceptions or 
failures are also systematic. (1998, 265) In the context of smooth theory, there is hope to 
discover the conditions under which it does not work.  Alexander Bird cites as an 
example of a smooth theory the ideal gas law. An ideal gas law works in a certain context 
and fails in some conditions; specifically, the ideal gas law works successfully in a 
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certain ranges of temperatures, pressures and volumes but systematically does not work 
in low temperatures and high pressures. (1998, 265)  
 6. Internal consistency. 
Consistency is an important property of a successful theory. Generally we believe that 
successful scientific theories are true or approximately true. But if there is any kind of 
contradiction in a theory then we cannot accept it as a true, since p and –p can not be 
simultaneously true. 
 7. Compatibility with well-grounded metaphysical beliefs. 
This is a kind of external consistency. When researchers try to construct a theory, they are 
inspired by certain established rules or beliefs. According to Newton-Smith, “theory 
construction and theory choice are guided by certain very general metaphysical beliefs.” 
(1981, 229) 
Using these criteria for theory choice, we can say that the best explanation for a 
set of data is one that satisfies the majority of these criteria. IBE thus helps researchers 
choose the best hypothesis from a lot of hypotheses. Using these criteria, scientists find 
the best hypothesis and reject alternative hypotheses, where the best hypothesis is the one 
that explains the evidence in the best possible way. As Gilbert H. Harman summarizes 
the process,  
in general, there will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so 
one must be able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted 
in making the inference. Thus one infers, from the premises that a given 
hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any 
other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true. (1965, 89) 
 
 Inferences, such as an inference to the best explanation, can be either inductive or 
deductive. Here it is important to mention that the true premises of an inductive inference 
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do not assure us that conclusion will be true. In this regard, explaining the data can play 
an important role in making an inference meaningful. According to Peter Lipton,  
our inferential practices are governed by explanatory considerations. Given our 
data and our background beliefs, we infer what would, if true, provide the best of 
the competing explanations we can generate of those data (so long as the best is 
good enough for us to make any inference at all). (1991, 58)  
 
He is claming that explanatory considerations guide what inferences we should make. 
IBE plays an important role in different phases of our personal and academic 
activities. Suppose one of our friends is invited to a party, but is absent from the party. 
How do we explain it? In this context, we can provide several hypotheses. 
a. He is sick 
b. He had a road accident. 
c. He forgot about the party. 
d. He does not enjoy parties. 
e. He is busy with urgent business. 
All of these hypotheses may be true. From our experience and our knowledge of his 
nature we might infer that the last explanation is the best and accordingly infer that it is 
true. Indeed it is a very common phenomenon in everyday activities for people to give a 
preference to the urgent business over attending parties. (See a similar argument in 
Ladyman 2002, 209) 
I would now like to discuss the role of IBE in our academic activities. In the first 
chapter I discussed both how constructive empiricists and scientific realists use inferences 
to prove the existence of observable entities Van Fraassen notes how IBE can be used to 
explain the sound of scratching in the wall or a missing piece of cheese. To explain these, 
he infers the existence of mouse and this inference is often quite reliable given our 
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knowledge of mice and their habits. According to van Fraassen, “I hear scratching in the 
wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears -- and I infer that a mouse 
has come to live with me. (1980, 19-20) Although he does not see the mouse, he infers its 
existence. He also infers the existence of a plane in the sky by observing a trail of vapour. 
Both of these inferences to the existence of a mouse and of a plane (whose cogency 
depends on experiential background knowledge) are for van Fraassen warranted. They 
are warranted because the inferred entity is observable. But van Fraassen expresses doubt 
about the role of IBE in inferring the existence of unobservable entities. For van 
Fraassen, as Stathis Psillos (1996) notes, “IBE is not a means of forming warranted 
beliefs about the realm of unobservable things or process. In other words, van Fraassen 
claims that IBE does not warrant belief when the potential explanation of the evidence 
stretches to the unobservable world.” (32)  Rather, constructive empiricists such as van 
Fraassen only use IBE to prove the existence of observable entities.  
Scientific realists on the other hand, use IBE to prove the existence of both 
observable and unobservable entities. According to Psillos “scientific realists have always 
suggested that IBE is the mode of reasoning that scientists follow in order to form their 
theoretical beliefs, and have argued that it can reliably produce and sustain 
(approximately) true beliefs about the world.” (1996, 31)  For example, we cannot 
observe dinosaurs at this stage. But we can prove their existence in the past using IBE. 
We find some evidence such as big fossils and footprints of a big animal. Explaining 
these specimens, we infer the existence of a huge animal. Moreover, we can get some 
reliable explanations of the causes of their extinction. That is, for realists, we gain 
information about unobservable entities and forces. 
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2.1 The ‘No Miracles’ Argument 
There are some influential arguments in favour of scientific realism. The ‘NMA’ is one of 
them, introduced by Hilary Putnam. According to Putnam, “realism is the only 
philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle.” (1975, 73) By 
‘miraculous’ we mean something that is unexplainable or unexpected. A lot of things 
were miraculous to our predecessors. They could not explain the causes of a flood-tide or 
an ebb-tide and they did not know the causes of rain or drought. To them, all of these 
things were miraculous. Comparatively, we can these days explain such phenomena 
successfully and our scientific explanations are true or approximately true. We can 
explain the causes of the rotation of the Earth and the Sun, medical scientists know the 
causes of several diseases, and the weather office can predict the weather of the next day 
or the next week. If we do not accept their theories as true or approximately true then 
their successes will be miraculous. But there is no room to consider these successes as 
miraculous events for us.  In this regard I would like to advance the following argument. 
Suppose an event occurs that seems to be miraculous.   But there is no scope to believe 
that this event is miraculous. Thus, when we find a comprehensive and elaborate 
explanation of this event, we can infer that this explanation is true. 
In the history of science, many scientific theories have been very successful, and 
by the NMA these theories are true or approximately true. Some theories of unobservable 
entities have been successful at explaining observed phenomena by postulating the 
existence of microscopic entities such as viruses and bacteria and I believe there is no 
miracle in the success of such theories. To define the aim of NMA Stathis Psillos writes, 
NMA aims to defend the realist claim that successful scientific theories should be 
accepted as true (or better, near true) descriptions of this world, in both its 
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observable and its unobservable aspects. In particular, the realist claim is that 
accepting that successful scientific theories describe truly (or near truly) the 
unobservable world best explains why these theories are empirically successful.” 
(1999, 71) 
 
To illustrate the NMA, let me cite some examples from medical science. 
According to medical science, several viruses and bacteria which occasionally attack 
human beings and other animals are responsible for several diseases. We cannot see these 
entities by the naked eye, but we can observe their effects. Moreover, these effects prove 
the existence of these microscopic entities; if these entities did not exist, the diseases and 
their symptoms would seem miraculous to us. In addition, medical science has discovered 
some medicines to treat these diseases and is successful in this purpose, where such 
medicines are designed with the nature of these microscopic organisms in mind. In this 
way, we prove the existence of microscopic organisms. There is no miracle, everything is 
explainable. 
In this context, I would like to discuss some activities of one sort of virus. We 
know that dengue is a viral fever and that the dengue virus is the cause of this fever. 
Aedes mosquitoes are the carrier of this virus. The symptoms of this disease are a high 
fever, rash, headache, bone pain, pain behind the eye and muscular pain, symptoms that 
may continue for five to seven days. At the beginning of the history of this fever, some 
symptoms were unfamiliar to common people and even medical scientists were in the 
dark about such a kind of fever. Some symptoms of this fever are different from all other 
fevers and initially medical scientists did not have any idea about its cause. At last they 
discovered the cause of dengue, and they also found the means to prevent it. Here 
medical science has made great strides in understanding this disease, and their success 
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proves that nothing is miraculous in the context of the dengue fever and that their 
knowledge about this virus and fever is accurate. 
At this stage I would like to explain how successful predictions work in favour of 
NMA. To began, I would like to clarify the idea of prediction. Prediction is an important 
criterion of a successful theory that works in favour of the reliability of scientific theories. 
Depending on some present information, we say something about present events or about 
future events -- this is called prediction. According to Stephen G. Brush, “in ordinary 
language ‘predict’ means foretell or ‘prophesy,’ implying a statement about future events. 
[Comparatively] physicists (and many other scientists) currently use the word to mean 
‘deduce from a theory’ whether before or after the fact is known or has occurred.” (1994, 
135) The accuracy of a prediction of any theory exhibits the success of that theory. In the 
history of science, we find many predictions that have been proved to be true, and those 
theories that successfully predict are accepted by scientists as true or approximately true. 
To illustrate a successful prediction, I would like to discuss Mendeleyev’s Periodic Table. 
Dimitri Ivanovich Mendeleyev (1834–1907) was a renowned chemist.  His great 
contribution to chemistry is the Periodic Table of chemical elements. Mendeleyev’s 
predictions using the Table show how prediction increases the reliability of a scientific 
theory. A good number of chemists during Mendeleyev’s time had worked to discover 
the basic chemical elements and they wanted to determine the various properties (such as 
atomic weight, density and specific heat) of these elements.  Mendeleyev, for his part 
(along with Julius Meyer), sought to find periodic relations between the elements and to 
arrange them according to their properties. Here Mendeleyev noticed, as Maher (1988) 
points out, “that if the elements were arranged by their atomic weights, then valences and 
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other properties tended to recur periodically” (274). In his research, Mendeleyev 
emphasized the properties of chemical elements and he made some predictions about the 
properties of chemical elements. Eventually, he presented his Table before the scientific 
community of Russia.  
Eventually, he noticed a gap in his Table and he predicted in 1871 the existence of 
some new chemical elements. He named three undiscovered chemical elements by 
describing their different properties (see Maher 1988, 274): 
1. eka-aluminum 
2. eka-boron 
3. eka-silicon 
This prediction is an important strength for the Mendeleyev’s Periodic Table. It exhibits 
the reliability of his knowledge of the chemical elements. It also illustrates the success of 
the scientific realists’ argument for the authenticity of scientific knowledge, since 
Mendeleyev’s predictions about the undiscovered elements were later proved true by 
chemists. In this regard, I would like to mention the contribution of Lecoq de 
Boisbaudran. In his research in 1875, he found an element that is very much similar to the 
properties of Mendeleyev’s eka-aluminum, an element he called gallium (Ihde 1964, 
248). This was an important event in the history of science. As Maher notes, “it was the 
first time in history that a person had correctly foreseen the existence and properties of an 
undiscovered element” (1988, 274). Nilson and Winkler added more support for about 
Mendeleyev’s predictions. In 1879, Nilson discovered a new chemical element that is 
similar to Mendeleyev’s eka-boron and Nilson named it scandium. And Mendeleyev’s 
third asserted element also turned to be true. In 1886 Clemens Winkler found an element 
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whose properties are similar to eka-silicon, an element called germanium. From this 
observation of the history of chemical elements, we can draw the conclusion that 
prediction plays an important role in science. Correct predictions help scientific theories 
to become meaningful. Mendeleyev’s accurate predictability made it sensible to accept 
his Periodic Table and illustrates the reliability of this Table. 
 
2.2 The Aim of Science is Truth or Approximate Truth. 
The aim of science is an important issue in scientific research. In The Scientific Image 
van Fraassen describes a new view on the aim of science. From my perspective, we know 
that science works to reveal the obscurities of nature and life; we have scientific 
knowledge of nature and life and we believe that scientific knowledge is true or 
approximately true. But van Fraassen says that the aim of science is not truth; rather, the 
aim of science is empirical adequacy. When a theory is empirically adequate, we accept 
it, where empirical adequacy only depends on observable consequences. In this respect, 
scientific realists have a very clear vision. According to scientific realism, the aim of 
science is to discover the truth or the approximate truth of a theory. Of course, in the 
history of science we find that a good number of scientific theories have been proved to 
be false. Still we can accept contemporary successful scientific theories as true or 
approximately true. Here scientific realists are being more optimistic than constructive 
empiricists. According to the realist Stathis Psillos,  
the best explanation of the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology is 
that background theories are relevantly approximately true. These background 
scientific theories have themselves been typically arrived at by abductive 
reasoning. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that abductive reasoning is reliable: it 
tends to generate approximately true theories. (1999, 80) 
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Scientific progress is a continuous process and its aim is to acquire certain knowledge of 
the world. 
 In his philosophy, van Fraassen discusses the success of science, on his view, the 
success of science is not miraculous, but he opposes the application of ‘true’ in the case 
of successful scientific theories involving reference to unobservables. Very much 
interestingly, he takes shelter in Darwin’s evolutionary theory to explain the success of 
scientific theories. He finds some similarities between successful scientific theories and 
the evolutionary theory of Darwin. According to evolutionary theory, a lot of species 
have been struggling for their survival in the world. The popular slogan in this context is 
‘Survival of the Fittest’. Everyone has to fight at every moment in their environment to 
survive, a task that is endless. Those species that are successful in this fight survive. So, 
in this regard, when asking “why the mouse runs from its enemy”, van Fraassen suggests 
that we not make reference to the true beliefs in the mouse’s head, but rather simply say 
that “species which did not cope with their natural enemies no longer exist”. (1980, 39) 
And, for van Fraassen, the same idea works in the case of scientific theories. In the 
history of the science, we see a lot of theories that have been struggling (like species) for 
their survival in the scientific world. Some of them can survive and some of them go 
extinct. Here, van Fraassen submits, there is no need to explain the success of a scientific 
theory by pointing to its truth. Rather, he comments, “born into a life of fierce 
competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw, [only] the successful theories survive -- the 
ones which in fact latched on to actual [observed] regularities in nature.” (1980, 40) 
 In response to the Darwinian explanation of the success of scientific theories I 
would like to say that there is no doubt that there are some similarities between Darwin’s 
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evolutionary theory and the process of scientific theory change. Some scientific theories 
have existed in the scientific world for a long time just as some species have existed for a 
long time in nature. Some species can adapt themselves keeping pace with the changing 
environment and an analogous phenomenon occurs in the case of scientific theories in 
that supporters of a paradigm try to enhance a theory’s ability to adapt to new situations. 
Still, although these characteristics show how species and theories are similar, we do not 
get any explanation of the predictability of scientific theories from this analogy. Here I 
would like to follow James Robert Brown in his explanation of the demerits of anti-realist 
views on the success of scientific theories. Brown sets forth three criteria for successful 
scientific theories (1994, 4) 
 1. The organising and unifying ability of theories. 
 2. The ability to systematize empirical data and  
 3. The predictability of scientific theories. 
Following the Darwinian view, van Fraassen can explain the first and second criteria of a 
successful scientific theory, but not the third criterion. Darwinian evolutionary theory 
can explain the changes of plants and animals, but we do not get any particular 
prediction about them through this theory. To show the limitation of van Fraassen’s 
analogy James Brown notes, “the Darwinian analogy breaks down since most species 
could not survive a radical change of environment,” (1994, 7) 
In the history of the philosophy of science there has been long debate on the aims 
of science. Realists and anti-realists are clearly divided in this aspect. According to 
constructive empiricism the aim of science is empirical adequacy. On the other hand, the 
goal of science according to scientific realists is to acquire truth or approximate truth. In 
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this regard, I would like to support scientific realism in a moderate sense. Scientists 
discover theories about observable and unobservable entities. We can consider a theory 
as true if its explanations and predictions are correct. If most of the predictions of a 
theory are correct then we can consider that theory as approximately truth. Now anti-
realists can say that the concept of approximate truth is vague. To clarify this concept I 
would like to cite an example -- we know that Everest is the tallest mountain of the earth 
and its height is 8,850 meters. If someone says that the height of Everest is 8,825 meters 
then we can accept it as approximate truth. In short approximate truth means its 
difference from truth is not too much. Now I would like to explain the concept of truth in 
science. According to scientific realism, we have good reason to accept a successful 
scientific theory as a true. At the very beginning of his research work, a scientist tries to 
construct a hypothesis. Then he deduces a single instance from this hypothesis and tests 
this instance. In this process he tests a large number of instances and at last he reaches a 
decision and establishes a theory. As long as we do not find any counter example, we 
accept this discovery as a true theory. In this context I would like to cite Avogadro’s 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the volume of a gas is directly proportional to 
the number of molecules of the gas. Therefore, two equal volumes of gas with the same 
pressure contain the same number of molecules. Subsequent researchers have tested this 
hypothesis and confirmed Avogadro’s result, even in cases when different kinds of gas 
are examined. As a result, it is established as a theory. As long as we do not get any 
negative instances, we can accept this theory as a true theory of science. 
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2.3 Van Fraassen’s Response to IBE 
In van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, he only accepts theories that explain 
observable entities and he is happy to draw inferences in the case of observable entities. 
In this respect we can cite his inference about the existence of a mouse. He observes 
some signs of the mouse, and depending on these signs, he draws an inference that there 
is a mouse. If we consider the existence of a mouse as a hypothesis then we see that this 
hypothesis is able to explain the available evidence (e.g., the distinctive ‘mouse sounds’, 
the disappearance of cheese, and so on). But van Fraassen expresses strong reservations 
about using IBE in the context of unobservable entities. Here again we find the basic 
problem of the observable/unobservable distinction. According to van Fraassen, IBE is 
acceptable in the case of observable entities but not in the case of unobservable entities. 
His contradictory position here is criticized by various philosophers. Stathis Psillos, for 
example, draws a distinction between horizontal and vertical IBE, where vertical IBE 
indicates abductive reasoning that involves hypotheses about unobservables and 
horizontal IBE means abductive reasoning that involves only hypotheses about 
unobserved but observable entities. Van Fraassen does not doubt the legitimacy of 
horizontal IBE, but rejects vertical IBE. Thus, following Psillos, we can ask the question, 
“what really is [van Fraassen’s] objection to vertical IBE and the formation of warranted 
beliefs about the unobservable world?” (1996, 32) That is, what is the difference between 
vertical and horizontal IBE that makes one acceptable and the other not? 
According to scientific realism, explanatory power is an important criterion in 
accepting scientific theories. We can explain an incident of nature or life in several ways 
and scientists choose the best of the possible explanations. For example, suppose we have 
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to explain an event. To this end we collect information about it. Different scientists then 
arrive at different theories depending on available information. As a result, we get several 
theories of this event. For example, given event ‘e’, a group of researchers may be 
involved in bringing to light the causes of this event and presenting their explanations 
separately in front of scientific community. Let’s suppose we have three theories A, B, 
and C concerned with the event ‘e’, and that 
A explains the event ‘e’ 
B explains the event ‘e’, and  
C explains the event ‘e’. 
Each of these theories may have different views on this event and the theories may differ 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. According to scientific realists, we accept the best 
explanation of the lot and realists suggest that this explanation describes a real state of 
affairs. But then the constructive empiricist asks -- which explanation is correct? All of 
them may be wrong, that is, scientists may be choosing the best amongst a bad lot of 
theories. This is the ‘bad lot’ argument advanced by constructive empiricists against 
scientific realists. We can show two kinds of attitudes to our contemporary successful 
scientific theories -- positive and negative attitude. If we show a positive attitude towards 
contemporary successful theories then we can believe that the truth lies within these 
theories. On the other hand, with a negative attitude, we say that the truth lies outside the 
current theories. Scientific realists show a positive attitude towards contemporary 
successful scientific theories, whereas anti-realists exhibit a negative attitude.  
 I would like to support scientific realism in this context and I will express my 
view by citing an example. Suppose some people in an area are suffering from diarrhea 
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and suppose we can find several explanations of the cause of this disease. Someone can 
argue that a bad sanitation system is the cause of this disease; someone can say that their 
drinking water was not pure and some people can argue that their food was not healthy. 
According to constructive empiricism all of these explanations may be wrong. This 
disease may have another cause which is not discovered by scientists; it may be possible 
that the real cause of this disease is still uncovered. Following van Fraassen, one can say 
that we could get a more accurate explanation of this disease in the future. But I would 
like to say that the different explanations of the cause of this disease can play a positive 
role in getting to the real cause of it and that we should not necessarily consider this set of 
theories as a bad lot. A researcher who is working on this disease will find some 
information by analyzing the present hypotheses. He can use the trial and error method to 
locate authentic knowledge. In any event, those researchers who do not have a minimum 
of background knowledge about this problem are similar to someone looking for a black 
cat in a dark room; for to be successful in research, certain conditions need to be in place, 
just as no one can find a black cat without enough light. In the context of scientific 
research, background knowledge helps researchers to reach their destination. As Psillos 
notes, “theory-choice operates within and is guided by a network of background 
knowledge.” (1996, 38)  
According to scientific realists, there is scope for further development of current 
successful scientific theories. I would like to say that present hypotheses and explanations 
of various problems do not close the door for further development. A phenomenon may 
have several explanations, but we do not accept all of them as true or approximate truth. 
Only when we can adequately justify an explanation must we accept it. Nothing is 
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accepted without sufficient evidence. Occasionally contemporary explanations do not 
show the whole truth, but still they can express a partial truth and lead researchers to the 
whole truth. To say, as van Fraassen seems to, that current theories of a subject-matter are 
bad lot, expresses an overly negative attitude towards scientific research and closes the 
way for the further development of science. In this respect, the bad lot argument 
represents a negative outlook about scientific knowledge. Rather, on my view, the 
successes of contemporary scientific theories show that there is no good reason to have 
such a negative attitude about science.  
In addition, van Fraassen’s position is contradictory in the context of explanation. 
According to him, the best explanation works in the case of observable entities (e.g., a 
mouse in the wainscoting) but it does not work in the case of unobservable entities. But, 
as Psillos notes, (1996, 41) if the realists’ best explanation concept is unwarranted then 
we can say that Fraassen’s empiricist best explanation concept is also unwarranted. For 
someone can say that constructive empiricists may be choosing an empirically adequate 
theory from a bad lot of empirically adequate theories. We may have a number of 
theories about an event and all of these theories may be empirically adequate to some 
degree. Yet following van Fraassen’s bad lot argument, perhaps the ‘truly’ empirical 
adequate theory is still unborn. According to Psillos, “it is more likely that the truth lies 
in the space of hitherto unborn hypotheses.” (1999, 217) As a result, constructive 
empiricists could be accepting an empirically adequate theory from a bad lot. Depending 
on these analyses, we can draw the conclusion that van Fraassen’s bad lot argument in 
fact goes against constructive empiricism.  
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Finally, I would like to say that van Fraassen’s view leads to skepticism. 
Scientists try to discover the truth of nature and life. For this purpose they follow 
different methods, collect a large amount of information, make hypotheses and test these 
hypotheses. Generally, researchers express a positive attitude towards their hypotheses 
and they try to discover the truth in these hypotheses.  It is true that the available theories 
or hypothesis do not guarantee that scientists will reach their destination. But there is no 
room to eliminate the possibility of truth among the present hypotheses. Van Fraassen 
rejects the possibility of truth in advancing his bad lot argument, and this rejection makes 
the path of skepticism in van Fraassen’s philosophy. 
 
2.4 Pessimistic Induction and Responses to It. 
Constructive empiricists claim that some previously successful scientific theories are not 
true in the present context. Thus, they conclude that we should not be certain about the 
future of our presently successful scientific theories. In this regard I would like to discuss 
Larry Laudan’s pessimistic induction which is an influential argument against scientific 
realism. Laudan depends on the history of science to make this argument. According to 
scientific realists, most of our current successful theories are true or approximately true. 
But a pessimistic induction vehemently opposes this view. In this respect, Larry Laudan 
presents historical evidence to refute scientific realism. In the history of science paradigm 
shifting has been a common phenomenon where old paradigms are replaced by new 
paradigms. Some theories which were considered as true are replaced by new theories, 
and now we consider the old theories as false. In this context, Laudan presents a long list 
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of theories that were successful in their field in the past, but at present are considered to 
be false. His list is: 
- the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy; 
- the humoral theory of medicine; 
- the effluvial theory of the static electricity; 
- ‘catastrophist’ geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachain) deluge; 
- the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
- the caloric theory of heat; 
- the vibratory theory of heat; 
- the vital force theories of physiology; 
- the electromagnetic aether; 
- the optical aether; 
- the theory of circular inertia; 
- theories of spontaneous generation. (Laudan 1981, 33)  
 
Citing this long list of past scientific theories, Laudan wants to show that the concept of 
truth does not make any sense in the context of successful scientific theories. Truth or 
approximate truth is not a necessary condition for the success of scientific theories. Some 
theories were successful in their respective areas but they were not true. Very much 
interestingly, Laudan claims that if present successful theories are true or approximately 
true then previous successful theories are false. This is true because there are significant 
differences between present and past theories. Moreover, he claims that our present 
successful theories may not be true in the future. 
Moreover, according to Laudan, “for every highly successful theory in the past of 
science which we now believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could find half a 
dozen once successful theories which we now regard as substantially non-referring” 
(1981, 35). That is, the unobservable entities that were referred by some previous theories 
are probably not real and do not have existence. From this historical evidence, Laudan 
tries to prove that the unobservable entities that are referred to by contemporary 
successful theories are not real. From here, Laudan suggests drawing the conclusion that 
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presently successful theories are also likely false. So, following Laudan (1981) we can 
draw the logical form of pessimistic induction in this way: 
If contemporary successful scientific theories are true, then previously successful 
scientific theories are false.  
But all contemporary successful scientific theories become in time previously successful 
theories.  
Therefore, contemporary successful theories are false. 
Here, I would like to counter Laudan by suggesting that he only offers a partial 
picture of the history of science. In his long list of scientific theories, he only cites those 
theories that have had serious problems. He deliberately avoids the truly successful 
theories of science. To evaluate the contribution of science, we have to discuss both the 
successes and failures of science. If we examine the history of human civilization then we 
can easily discern the differences in living standards between our ancestors and us. We 
use computer technology, lead a comfortable life, and have even sent people to the moon. 
What does this prove? Certainly these are the indicators of the success of science. But it 
would be mistaken to consider the success of contemporary science as a miraculous 
achievement, and unless our scientific picture of the world were correct, we would be 
forced to say that such success is miraculous.  The optimist is swayed by these 
considerations, and thinks that contemporary successful theories are true or 
approximately true. On the other hand, a pessimist tries to pick up the negative instances 
from the history of science.  
  I do not say that scientific theories are always true or the absolute truth. If we 
discuss the history of science then we see that the claims of anti-realists are partially true. 
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But this does not make us pessimistic about our present scientific theories or the success 
of science. If we analyze the nature of science, we can realize that science is a 
progressive subject. From the history of science we see that sciences are developing day 
by day. A theory dominates a certain area of science and sometimes it makes a path for a 
new theory. This is a positive aspect of science; in this way science is enriched. Scientists 
do not demand that their theories are the final or absolute truth; if they did, science would 
not have any scope for further development. Moreover, they try to develop their invented 
theories. In this process they sometimes change their theories. But this does not indicate 
that previous theories are completely false. 
It is true that the pessimistic induction is the basis for a strong argument against 
scientific realism. But pessimism is not the final result about scientific theories. The 
different positive contributions of scientific theories to the different aspects of life and 
nature make us optimistic about science. In this regard, several philosophers such as 
Philip Kitcher, John Worrall and Stathis Psillos reject Laudan’s pessimistic attitude about 
scientific theories. All of them explain science as a continuous developing process, one 
that does not stand still. In this continuous process, scientists accept new theories and 
reject old theories. This rejection does not exhibit pessimism in science. A scientific 
theory has several parts. In its evolving process, scientists emphasize the useful parts and 
reject the useless portion. So, to reject pessimism in science, realists should pick up the 
important, useful and perhaps true parts of a theory. As Psillos notes, “the best way to 
defend realism is to use the generation of stable and invariant elements in our evolving 
scientific image to support the view that these elements represent our best bet for what 
theoretical mechanism and laws there are.” (1999, 109)  
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In the process of rejecting and accepting the different parts of a scientific theory, 
realists should find out the essential part of a theory. The essential part of a theory may 
prove that this theory is true or approximately true. For example, Kitcher (1993, 149) 
notes that there are two kinds of posits in scientific practice -- ‘working posits’ and 
‘presuppositional posits.’ He defines working posits as, ‘the putative referents of terms 
that occur in problem-solving schemata’ and defines the presuppositional posits as ‘those 
entities that apparently have to exist if the instances of the schemata are to be true.’ 
Kitcher considers the ether, the mechanical medium that early theorists claimed was 
necessary for the propogation of light waves, as a presuppositional posit. It does not play 
any role in the context of explanation and prediction in the current theory of 
electromagnetism, despite the fact that James Clerk Maxwell in first developing this 
theory assumed its existence.  Comparatively, the true working posits of ether theory 
remain (i.e., Maxwell’s equations) even if the ether is shown not to exist. 
John Worrall’s views on pessimistic induction are also relevant in this regard.  
Worrall tries to refute Laudan’s pessimistic induction. In explaining the history of 
successful scientific theories, he supports an optimistic induction instead of a pessimistic 
induction. He comments, “structural realism encourages an optimistic induction from the 
history of theory-change in science, but an optimistic induction concerning the discovery 
of mathematical structure rather than individual ontology.” (1994, 336) Like Kitcher and 
Psillos he also divides a successful scientific theory into different components -- the 
essential component and idle component. Thus, he suggests, “no realist should advocate a 
‘realist attitude’ towards all theoretical claims -- even theoretical claims within successful 
64 
theories.” (1994, 336) For among the theoretical entities in different successful theories, 
some do not play any significant role. 
 To refute the pessimistic induction Psillos offers various arguments, of which the 
divide et impera move is one. According to this argument, a successful scientific theory 
may have different parts. The parts do not have equal importance and not every part 
contributes to the success of the theory; some parts do not play any useful role and are 
eliminable parts of a successful theory.  So realists should not accept every part of a 
successful theory; they should be selective about accepting parts of a successful theory. 
This process will help them reject the false part of a theory, where the false part of a 
theory does not play any active role in the success of a scientific theory. To define the 
divide et impera move Psillos remarks,  
it is based on the claim that when a theory is abandoned, its theoretical 
constituents, i.e., the theoretical mechanisms and laws it posited, should not be 
rejected en bloc. Some of those theoretical constituents are in consistent with what 
we now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not all are. Some of 
them have been retained as essential constituents of subsequent theories. (1999, 
108) 
  
In explaining the divide et impera move, Psillos cites caloric theory and ether theory. 
Both these theories were once successful, despite the fact that they postulate entities -- 
caloric and the luminiferous ether -- that are not real. According to Psillos, the references 
to such entities are the idle parts of these theories. As a result, they are abandoned in the 
next development of theories. Still, these theories have some true or approximately true 
parts that help them to be successful. Scientific realists should pick up the true or 
approximate true part of a successful theory and should determine the idle part of a 
successful theory. In this way, they can disprove the pessimistic induction in the context 
of successful scientific theories. 
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To conclude this chapter, I would like to say that explanation is an important 
characteristic of a successful scientific theory and I have argued in favour of this virtue of 
a scientific theory. In this context I mentioned some criteria that make a hypothesis 
reliable. At the same time they also work as indicator of a successful scientific theory. I 
have argued in favour of IBE and tried to show how IBE works in the context of both 
observable and unobservable entities. Van Fraassen himself uses IBE in proving the 
existence of mouse. To refute the IBE, Van Fraassen uses the bad lot argument. But we 
have seen that van Fraassen has failed to refute IBE. Moreover, we have found that a bad 
lot argument goes against van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that this argument 
leads to an unwarranted situation in which the truth is claimed to lie outside the range of 
presently successful theories. As a result, we can reject the bad lot argument in the 
context of IBE. 
From the above discussion we can realise that scientists discover the truth about 
nature and life (even though sometimes, or even lots of times, they fail at this). To 
succeed at discovering the truth, scientists have to go through a process. In this process, 
we get several activities, such as data collection, hypothesis making and hypothesis 
testing. Scientists get several kinds of results with their theories -- some of them are false, 
some are approximately truth and some are true. I differ from the widely accepted view 
that scientific discoveries are either true or false. Here I would like to suggest that there is 
room for partial or approximate truth. I would like to say that, although absolute truth is 
not possible in science, scientists can achieve approximate truth and our present 
successful theories are closer to the truth than previous theories. This is the progressive 
character of science. Moreover, the idea of absolute truth is a dogmatic attitude that 
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closes the path of progress in science and contradicts the central character of science. 
Instead of the concept of absolute truth, the concept of approximate truth makes scientific 
realism flexible as well as realistic. We can accept this concept of realism. 
In the history of science, we see some past successful theories that are not active 
in the present context. This might lead us to be pessimistic about scientific theories. But 
this is not the only true lesson about past science -- its opposite side is also true. Some 
previously successful theories are still working in their areas successfully. This 
experience helps us to be optimistic about science. There is no scope to deny the 
importance of the contributions of our previous scientists. Sometimes we see successors 
receiving help from their predecessors’ contributions. In paradigm-based research, we see 
a group of scientists working for the development of their paradigm. The old paradigm is 
fully or partially replaced by the new paradigm. But this new paradigm is not new 
forever. This new paradigm may itself be replaced by another new paradigm. In this way 
science moves ahead and the history of science is enriched by several contributors. Still, 
the contributors of the new paradigm receive some information from the previous 
paradigm. In this changing process of the history of science, we see that some of the 
claims of successful scientific theories have survived for a long time, that some 
theoretical entities referred by previously successful theories are real, and that some of 
the claims of previous scientific theories still serve as a source of information. All of 
these points should make us optimistic about science.  
We have advanced a moderate sense of scientific realism in the context of the 
divide et impera move argument. To refute the pessimistic induction, Psillos presents this 
argument to show that the idle parts of a successful theory do not play important role in 
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the success of a theory and these can be removed. Thus in being realist about a theory we 
need not affirm the truth of these idle parts. This moderate sense of scientific realism 
makes it more acceptable than a hard-core realism that asserts the truth of all parts of a 
successful theory. 
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Conclusion 
 
I would now like to analyze the previous chapters and evaluate the arguments of 
constructive empiricists and scientific realists. In the first chapter I discussed 
‘observation’ and ‘the power of observation’. Observation plays an important role for the 
purpose of acquiring knowledge. In the history of the philosophy of science, we see that 
various philosophers have contributed to the discussion on observation and the capacity 
to observe. Once people observed only through the naked eye, but now they use different 
sophisticated instruments for the purpose of observations -- this is a huge development in 
the context of observations. To keep pace with this technological development of 
observations, we see that the literature on the power of observation is enriched by the 
valuable contributions of different philosophers. In contemporary philosophy, both 
constructive empiricists and scientific realists contribute to this debate. In my discussion I 
have tried to show the major arguments of constructive empiricists and scientific realists. 
In the first chapter of my thesis, I have discussed how van Fraassen rejects instrument-
based observations and why he only believes in naked eye observations. He only believes 
in naked eye observations for the purpose of acquiring reliable knowledge. According to 
him, we cannot observe a thing through an instrument; we can only observe the images of 
things through instruments that cannot provide us with reliable knowledge. Constructive 
empiricists give more credit to naked eye observation than to instrument-based 
observation. 
On the other hand, scientific realists accept both naked eye and instrument-based 
observation as sources of reliable knowledge. Contemporary scientists do not limit their 
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observation to only naked eye observations. They use different instruments to extend 
their ability to observe. Scientific realists support instrument-based observation as an 
important means of acquiring knowledge about nature and life. They try to show that 
observation is a circumstance-dependent activity -- if we are able to change the 
circumstances, then we can turn unobservables into observables. For example, we do not 
see a thing in a dark place. However, we can see it if we bring it under light. A similar 
idea works in the case of micro-organisms. Once researchers could not observe micro-
organisms, nor could they even detect them. But now they are able to observe them using 
sophisticated instruments. Again, I cannot observe a distant thing clearly by the naked 
eye but my spectacles help me to see things clearly. All of these instances are working in 
favour of scientific realism to prove that observation is a circumstance dependent activity. 
Depending on only naked eye observations for the purpose of acquiring 
knowledge, constructive empiricists show a conservative attitude to the domain of 
knowledge. They confine their research to a certain area and reject knowledge of sub-
atomic particles and micro-organisms. But following the history of science, we can say 
that the domain of knowledge is open-ended and progressive. Constructive empiricists 
cannot make a limit or boundary of this domain. In this context, we see that the scientific 
realists’ position is very reasonable. They extend their power of observation through 
different instruments. I have shown in the previous chapters that instrument-based 
observations are reliable, and that scientists are using different instruments to observe 
such things as micro-organisms. Moreover, in this context they are successful. As a 
result, we can say that the scientific realists’ view on the power of observation is more 
acceptable than that of the constructive empiricists. 
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Finding a demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities is an 
important mission of constructive empiricists. But we have seen that they cannot make 
any clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities. In this regard, 
they have chosen anthropocentric observation as the criterion to distinguish between 
observable and unobservable entities. But we have seen in the above discussion how 
naked eye observations deceive us and that what is observable with the naked eye needs 
theoretical explanation to be meaningful. As a result, sometimes we cannot accept naked 
eye observation as a reliable means of observation without further justification. In the 
history of science we find that the power of observation changes with technological 
development, and as a result van Fraassen’s demarcation line between observable and 
unobservable entities is also changeable. 
Constructive empiricists express doubt about the knowledge of theoretical 
entities. In the above discussion I have argued in favour of the mind-independent 
existence of unobservable entities. The ability to observe and the failure to observe 
depend on observers and their circumstances. For example, I argued in favour of the 
existence of a theoretical construct (i.e., refractive index) to explain the phenomenon of 
refraction. Overall, we see that both observable and theoretical entities exist and that one 
helps the other to prove their existence. This fact is borne out by the revolutionary change 
in contemporary medical science. Medical scientists are able to determine the causes of 
several diseases. Some microorganisms like viruses or bacteria are responsible for certain 
diseases (such as influenza and dengue) and medical scientists not only discover the 
causes of these diseases but have discovered the means to prevent them. These activities 
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and their observed successes prove the authenticity of medical knowledge about micro-
organisms and prove as well the existence of different micro-organisms. 
In my thesis I have discussed IBE and have shown how IBE works in scientific 
research as well as in our every day activities. Bas van Fraassen, a notable critic of 
scientific realism, follows IBE in his argument to prove the existence of observable 
entities (such as the mouse in his wainscoting) but does not use it in the context of 
unobservable entities. I have discussed in the second chapter of my thesis the NMA and 
have shown how it works in favour of scientific realism. In contemporary medical 
science, scientists have discovered several microorganisms and some of them are harmful 
to human beings and other animals. Medical scientists are working to get rid of these 
problems and in some respects they are successful. Some of the epidemics that were once 
considered as the curse of God or some supernatural power have been successfully 
explained by scientists. Even today, some people consider a tsunami to be a miraculous 
event or a curse of God. But a tsunami is not a miraculous things or a curse for we can 
explain the cause of it. There is no scope to consider these occurrences as miraculous in 
this advanced stage of civilization. If we say that our knowledge of microorganisms, 
things like viruses or bacteria, is not reliable, then we have to deny the various successes 
of medical science, such as immunization and vaccination programs. The success of 
science in different aspects of nature and life would be miraculous if we did not consider 
our contemporary successful scientific theories as true or approximately true.  
  To refute IBE, van Fraassen uses his ‘bad lot argument’. It is an important 
suggestion made by van Fraassen to be careful about accepting any theory. No one has 
doubt the importance of carefully accepting any scientific theory. It is only after a long 
72 
process of justification that a scientist should accept a theory. Still I would like to say that 
van Fraassen’s suggestion does not subvert the reliability of the knowledge contained in 
successful scientific theories. That is, we need not follow van Fraassen in rejecting the 
possibility of reliable knowledge in successful scientific theories and becoming skeptical. 
In denying van Fraassen’s view, that truth lies beyond contemporary successful theories, 
scientific realists express an optimistic attitude that could easily play a very important 
role in encouraging researchers to solve different problems and make new discoveries in 
science. 
In my thesis I have discussed several criteria for successful scientific theories and 
I have explained a realist philosophical view on successful scientific theories. In this 
regard we have seen some similarities between constructive empiricists and scientific 
realists. But we have seen that van Fraassen ignores the predictability of successful 
scientific theories that is an important criterion of successful scientific theories. He 
defines the success of science from an empirical standpoint. But his analogy between 
successful scientific theory and Darwin’s evolutionary theory does not provide any 
explanation of the predictability of successful scientific theories. In our discussion on 
Periodic Table, we saw how Mendeleyev predicted the existence of undiscovered 
chemical elements and his success in this regard certainly works in favour of scientific 
realism. It adds credit to scientific realism.  
In my thesis I have discussed the aim of science. In this context, van Fraassen 
says that the aim of science is not truth but rather empirical adequacy. On the other hand, 
according to scientific realists, the aim of science is truth. In this debate, my position is in 
favour of a moderate sense of realism that supports that the aim of science as approximate 
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truth. I can explain my position in this way. To begin with, what does van Fraassen mean 
by truth? Does he indicate absolute or eternal truth in the context of scientific theories? It 
is clear that scientists do not pursue such kind of truth.  Snow is cold and all bachelors are 
unmarried -- those are absolute truths. No one expresses doubt about them. But scientific 
theories are not such kinds of truths. It is a fact that scientific knowledge is changeable; 
science rejects rigidity as regards aims and methods.   The idea of absolute truth is a rigid 
idea and it is not applicable to any changing subject-matter like science. Thus, we have to 
consider truth in a moderate sense in the context of science. In the history of science, we 
see that a paradigm works in a particular area for a certain period of time. No paradigm is 
eternal in the scientific world; previous paradigms are replaced by new paradigms. As 
long as a paradigm exists, it exists as a source of truth, and we accept a scientific theory 
as true so long as it corresponds to its subject matter in an appropriate manner. This 
liberal approach towards scientific theories shows that scientists are not dogmatic about 
their discoveries. If anyone claims than science provides us with absolute truth, then I 
would like to say that this is not the aim of science for it is beyond the scope of scientific 
activities. It is out of human capacity to achieve eternal truth or absolute certainty. In this 
context, I would like to quote from Bertrand Russell -- according to him, “final truth 
belongs to heaven, not to this world.” (1927, 3) 
 We have seen that van Fraassen differs with scientific realists about the aims and 
research areas of science. He restricts the research field to naked eye observations for the 
aim of acquiring reliable knowledge. He believes that scientists aim only for empirical 
adequacy. Theories, at best, are said to be empirically adequate and if scientists try to go 
further than empirical adequacy they take an unnecessary risk for truth. As Ladyman et 
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al., (1997) note, “certainly the realist takes an extra epistemic risk by believing the 
background theories to be (approximately) true rather than only empirically adequate” 
(308). Believing in truth instead of empirical adequacy, scientists cannot show any extra 
empirical gain (Ladyman 2002, 224). As a result van Fraassen suggests that we not take 
this extra risk. In this context, van Fraassen says, “there is no argument there for belief in 
the truth of accepted theories, since it is not an epistemological principle that one might 
as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb.” (1980, 72) This is the main difference between 
truth and empirical adequacy -- truth requires more information than empirical adequacy.  
The possibility of epistemic risk is an interesting objection against scientific 
realism in scientific research. In claiming that aided-observation leads to knowledge, the 
scientific realist is taking more of a risk than the constructive empiricist. Comparatively, 
constructive empiricists are more careful than scientific realists in approaching scientific 
investigation -- certainly their epistemic caution presents an interesting contrast to 
scientific realists. Van Fraassen is suggesting that we limit scientists’ beliefs to empirical 
adequacy; scientists should limit their research to observable entities. If anyone extends 
her beliefs to more than empirical adequacy and she wants to know more than the 
observable entities, i.e., through instrument-based observations, then there is a possibility 
of mistake. In this context, scientific realists believe that scientific knowledge about 
unobservable entities is reliable and that scientific theories are true or approximately true. 
According to constructive empiricism, such a belief poses an unnecessary risk for 
scientific realists; it is unnecessary and unproductive to pursue the truth instead of 
empirical adequacy. But in the above discussion we see that sometimes we get more 
reliable knowledge about unobservable entities than about observable entities. We have 
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also seen that there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye observations than to 
instrument-based observations. Moreover, we have seen that naked eye observations may 
deceive us. So, naked eye observations are epistemically risky as well. 
 Constructive empiricists also express strong reservations regarding the inference 
from observable actions to unobservable entities. Here they are engaging the classical 
inductive debate. Depending on some present available instances, scientists draw a 
conclusion about unknown instances. They take a leap to the unknown. For example, 
suppose we observe some black crows and from these observations draw the conclusion 
that all crows are black. This is an inductive leap to a much stronger claim. Similarly, 
depending on some observable actions of unobservable entities, we might infer the 
existence of some unobservable entities. This is also a leap and such a leap is part and 
parcel of scientific research. Someone might describe this as a limitation of research or 
scientific knowledge. Someone might say that there are white crows in the deep forest 
and, to be sure, no one can prove or disprove it. It is not possible for a human being to see 
all the crows in the world. Still, observing some black crows we draw the conclusion that 
crows are black and as long as we do not see any white crows we can accept this 
statement as true. Here we take a leap. But if anyone considers this leap as too risky in 
the context of acquiring reliable knowledge then I would like to say that this risk is 
essential to the progress of science. Scientific realists want to know the truth in scientific 
theories, so they take such kinds of risk. According to Psillos,  
in taking this extra risk, the realist wants to know more about scientific theories 
than the constructive empiricist. So the latter is unjustified in suggesting that this 
risk is not worth taking on safety grounds for two reasons: first, this is also to take 
an inductive risk which goes beyond current evidence; and second if risk is the 
price for pushing back the frontiers of ignorance, then, as the motto of this paper 
suggests, it is a price well worth paying. (1996, 42) 
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At last I would like to say that science is a progressive concept. Its discoveries 
make our lives easier; science makes it easy to acquire knowledge. In the history of 
science, we find some scientific discoveries that have been proved false but we cannot 
deny the success of science. Science is a human activity and so it has some limitations. 
So under the umbrella of science, no one can say that it is the final or absolute truth. To 
say that science currently has the absolute truth is a dogmatic attitude and there is no 
scope for dogmatism in science. Science is open-ended for further development and 
scientists are open-minded to accept new theories. This is the way of progress in science 
and scientific progress may continue indefinitely. The debates between constructive 
empiricists and scientific realists are progressing and in this process we are getting 
interesting arguments, concepts and theories. In my thesis, I have tried to show the 
existence of observable and unobservable entities in our world. If we want to know our 
world comprehensively then we have to explore both of them. But constructive 
empiricists rely only on the observable entities. In fact, not only the naked eye but also 
instruments help us for the purpose of observations. Scientific realists accept instrument-
based observation as a reliable source of knowledge. As a result, they are getting more 
opportunities than constructive empiricists to know life and nature. We saw that Laudan’s 
pessimistic induction is skeptical about scientific knowledge. On the other hand, a 
realist’s optimistic attitude about scientific theories can play a positive role in their 
development. The realists’ ‘NMA’ plays an important role for successful scientific 
theories in achieving a firm position in the domain of knowledge. The success of medical 
science is also a strong argument in favour of scientific realism. Considering all these 
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aspects of scientific realism, we can give more credit to scientific realism than to 
constructive empiricism.  
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